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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the media, a neglected but important
institution that plays a role in influencing Chinese antitrust
enforcement. Drawing from the methodology used in communication
studies, the Article conducted a content analysis of 1,394 news
reports on six high-profile Chinese antitrust investigations from 2008
to 2015. The findings demonstrate that in reporting antitrust
investigations, Chinese media tends to be biased against firms under
investigation. Instead of providing a balanced and objective account
of the story, the media was an effective conduit for amplifying the
populist concern, and aided and abetted the regulator in advancing
its enforcement. The Article argues that such an outcome is driven by
at least three factors: the regulator’s strategic leakage of information
to state-controlled media, the rarity of public dissents of agency
decisions, and the populist pressures for lower prices and
nationalism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
China is the second-largest economy in the world. However, it
was not until 2007 that it passed the Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”),
its first modern antitrust legislation. Since the AML went into effect
in 2008, antitrust investigations have made constant headlines in
China. In 2009, Coca-Cola’s bid for Huiyuan, a domestic juice
manufacturer, generated a fierce debate among the Chinese public
about whether a famous domestic brand should be swallowed by a
large foreign multinational. 1 The deal was ultimately blocked by the
Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), causing a stir in the business
and legal communities 2 In 2011, the National Development and
Reform Commission (the “NDRC”) made a surprise announcement of
its investigation into China Telecom and China Unicom on the China
Central Television (“CCTV”). 3 This unusual move led to a public
row among several state-controlled media outlets and ignited a heated
debate about antitrust regulation of state-owned enterprises
1. See infra Section VI.B.
2. David Barboza, China Blocks Coke Bid for Juice Maker, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 18,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/business/worldbusiness/19coke.html [https://perm
a.cc/Z8QG-ATRG] (archived on Jan. 3, 2018).
3. See infra Section IV.A.
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(“SOEs”). 4 In less than two months, China Telecom and China
Unicom relented and offered remedies and requested that the
investigation be suspended. 5 Two years later, the NDRC applied the
same tactic by publicly announcing its investigation into nine infant
formula manufacturers on the CCTV. 6 Before the agency formally
imposed any legal sanction, infant formula producers had already
started announcing significant price reductions of their products. 7
These episodes suggest that the media may play a role in influencing
antitrust enforcement in China. What are the mechanisms through
which the media can potentially influence public enforcement of the
AML? Is there a bias in the media’s coverage of antitrust
investigations in China? What are the factors driving the supply and
demand of media content?
Chinese antitrust enforcement presents an excellent setting for
examining the role of the media in law enforcement. First, Chinese
antitrust cases are often very visible—this is due not only to the
prominence of the targets involved, but also to the fact that many of
the cases involve daily consumer products or services. The media has
an interest in covering these cases, as they directly concern consumer
prices and relate to the welfare of the general public. Second, China
only started to enforce its AML eight years ago, so the media has not
yet established a long track record of imposing reputational penalties
on firms subject to antitrust investigations. Otherwise, firms would
not commit such violations in the first place or would quickly yield to
the agency’s demands to avoid negative publicity. As such, the early
years of the enforcement of the AML provide us with a unique
opportunity to observe a transient stage when the authority of the
antitrust enforcement agency has not been well-established. Third,
China lacks the western-style of legal governance, with an
independent court providing effective checks on administrative
abuse. 8 Despite hectic enforcement by Chinese antitrust agencies and
mounting complaints lodged by foreign businesses with their
chambers of commerce, there have thus far been few challenges to

Id.
Id.
See infra Section IV.B.
Id.
Angela Huyue Zhang, Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 47
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 671, 677-80 (2014).
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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public antitrust enforcement. 9 As a consequence, the power to enforce
the law is monopolized by the government, which leaves much room
for other non-competition factors to influence its enforcement agenda
and outcomes.
Using media content analysis, 10 I conducted a close examination
of 1,394 news reports on six Chinese high-profile antitrust
investigations from 2008 to 2015. I have several major findings. First,
in two cases, Chinese antitrust regulators strategically leaked
information about their investigations to the CCTV. Such leaking
helped the agency obtain the first mover advantage to shape the
editorial slant and leverage the public opinion to push forward its
investigation. Although on one occasion, two powerful SOEs
launched a media campaign to defend themselves, there was no
countervailing effort from other private domestic or foreign firms.
Second, due to the lack of judicial checks on agency discretion, there
is little market demand for expert criticisms of agency decisions. As
such, domestic antitrust experts are disincentivized to voice dissent,
9. Indeed, foreign multinational companies have voiced mounting complaints against
Chinese antitrust authorities for deficiencies in transparency and due process. In a survey
conducted by the US-China Business Council in 2014, over eighty six percent of the surveyed
companies indicated that they were “somewhat” or “very” concerned about the AML
enforcement, citing issues such as discrimination, lack of due process and regulatory
transparency, and use of noncompetition factors as major concerns. The reports released by
the Chambers of Commerce in both the United States and Europe also contained scathing
criticisms of China’s hectic antitrust enforcement in recent years. See US-China Business
Council, USCBC 2014 CHINA BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SURVEY RESULTS: GROWTH
CONTINUES AMIDST RISING, 20 (2014), https://www.uschina.org/reports/uscbc-2014-chinabusiness-environment-survey-results [https://perma.cc/37ZY-KDB3] (last visited Jan. 3,
2018); US CHAMBER OF COMM., COMPETING INTERESTS IN CHINA’S COMPETITION LAW
ENFORCEMENT: CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW APPLICATION AND THE ROLE OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 77-78 (2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/aml_final_
090814_final_locked.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9TH-NDX8 (last visited Jan. 3, 2018] (The US
Chamber of Commerce accused the Chinese government of using the AML to advance
industrial policy goals at the expense of free competition, curtailing intellectual property
protection of foreign firms, and enforcing the AML without an adequate due process
safeguard.); see also European Chamber of Commerce, European Chamber Releases
Statement On China AML-Related Investigations (August 13, 2014), http://www.european
chamber.com.cn/en/press-releases/2132/european_chamber_releases_statement_on_china_am
l_related_investigations [https://perma.cc/6WZR-LEXT] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) ( “It [The
Commerce] had received numerous alarming anecdotal accounts from a number of sectors that
administrative intimidation tactics are being used to impel companies to accept punishments
and remedies without full hearings. Practices such as informing companies not to challenge the
investigations, bring lawyers to the hearings or involve their respective governments or
chambers of commerce are contrary to best practices.”).
10. KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK (2d ed. 2017).
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which dampens the frequency of public criticism of antitrust
intervention. Third, the Chinese media as a whole shows little interest
in understanding the legal merits of antitrust cases and the media
coverage caters to the populist demands for lower prices and
nationalist concerns. Thus, the Chinese media lacks the incentive to
expose criticisms over regulatory intervention and the editorial slant
tends to spin in the direction that is damaging to the company under
investigation. The media becomes a conduit for amplifying the
populist concern, aiding and abetting the regulator in advancing its
enforcement.
This Article contributes to several strands of literature. First, in a
series of papers, Dyck, Zingales, and their coauthors conducted the
seminal work of exploring the role of media in corporate
governance.11 Using evidence from Russia, another country beset by
weak legal institutions, they found that foreign media coverage could
be strategically employed to discipline corporate governance
violations of firms. 12 This Article examines the role of the media in
another area of law enforcement and another jurisdiction. In contrast
to Dyck’s findings that domestic media did not have an impact on
corporate governance in Russia, this Article identifies some
preliminary evidence suggesting that domestic media in China can be
a powerful influence upon enforcement outcomes in Chinese antitrust
law.
Second, this Article contributes to the study of the relationship
between competition and truth in the news market. As with any other
product on the market, the quantity and the quality of the information
produced by the media depends on both supply and demand. Thus far,
economic literature has found that competition is effective in
eliminating media bias from the supply side, but the evidence of the
media bias driven by consumer demand is inconclusive. 13
Mullainathan and Shleifer argued that competition does not enhance
accuracy, as long as consumers would rather read less accurate news
11. ALEXANDER DYCK & LUIGI ZINGALES, The Bubble and the Media, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce
Kogut eds., 2002); Alexander Dyck et al., The Corporate Governance Role of the Media:
Evidence from Russia, 63 J. FIN. 1093 (2008); Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle
on Corporate Fraud, 65 J. FIN. 2213 (2010).
12. Dyck et al., supra note 11.
13. See Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Competition and Truth in the Market
for News, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE 133, 114-15 (2008) (giving a comprehensive review of the
literature).

478

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:473

than have their personal beliefs challenged. 14 Gentzkow and Shapiro
reached the opposite conclusion in their paper, but their conclusion
was drawn upon a different assumption that readers’ confirmatory
preferences are driven by a desire for accuracy. 15 The media bias
identified in this Article seems to confirm the insights of
Mullainathan and Shleifer. As illustrated in the studies of cases
involving resale price maintenance (“RPM") practices, the
competition among commercialized media outlets in China did not
improve accuracy in reporting; rather, it appears to worsen the biases
in many instances.
Third, this Article also relates to a strand of literature on
empirical studies on media bias in China. Until now, most empirical
studies of media bias have been staged in settings with strong
democratic characteristics, and empirical studies on the role of the
media in authoritarian regimes remain a nascent field. One study finds
that the surge of commercial newspapers in China can reduce readers’
exposure to highly biased newspapers but does not diminish the
political bias within the same newspapers. 16 Another recent study
identifies evidence suggesting that commercialization allows Chinese
newspapers to attenuate political influences and cater better to the
preferences of consumers. 17 In a departure from these studies, this
research explores media bias in covering corporate misconduct, a
topic that is generally deemed non-sensitive and is not subject to tight
political control. This Article thus attempts to fill in a gap in the
literature in understanding how Chinese media uncovers nonpolitically sensitive commercial news.
Fourth, the Article contributes to the study of the media’s role in
the Chinese legal system. Liebman pioneered the study in examining
the dual role that the media has played in influencing judicial
decisions: on the one hand, extensive media coverage of a case can
14. See generally Sendhill Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, The Market for News, 95
AM. ECON. REV. 1031 (2005).
15. See generally Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media Bias and Reputation,
114 J. POL. ECON. 280 (2006).
16 . Bei Qin et al., Media Bias in Autocracies: Evidence from China (Sept. 2014),
http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~yanhuiwu/MediaBias1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BM8-AVX4] (last
visited Jan. 3, 2018).
17. Joseph D. Piotroski et al., Political Bias of Corporate News in China: Role of
Commercialization and Conglomeration Reforms, (May 2016) (unpublished research paper,
Stanford University Graduate School of Business), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2674780 [https://
perma.cc/GW3D-MZR9] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
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pressure courts to act more carefully and fairly, but on the contrary, it
could also encourage more political intervention in the courtroom,
predetermine the outcomes of cases, and strengthen the Chinese
Communist Party (the Party)’s control over the court. 18 This Article
focuses on a different aspect of the legal system and examines how
media coverage influences public enforcement of administrative law.
As illustrated by the case studies below, rather than injecting more
checks and balances into the legal system, extensive media coverage
of an antitrust investigation could exacerbate the biases against
investigated firms. This is consistent with the findings by Stockman
and Gallagher in their study of labor law related disputes in China,
where the authors found that the media content hewed closely to the
Party line. 19
Finally, this Article contributes to the institutionally-oriented
research on antitrust law. Antitrust law made significant strides in the
20th century by incorporating more economic insights into its analysis.
While the criteria in legal analysis have become more objective, the
power to enforce the law lies with the institutional actors. In an ideal
setting, antitrust regulators should set their enforcement agenda
independently, enforce the law non-discriminatorily, and observe due
process requirements, whereas an independent judiciary should
provide an effective check on administrative discretion and agency
abuse. 20 China’s experience with antitrust enforcement reveals the
potential risks in adopting an antitrust law without such institutional
safeguards. The effects of the media in influencing antitrust
investigation is another example of how extralegal factors could
affect the enforcement outcomes of the AML in China.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II sets the stage by
introducing the institutional background of the Chinese newspaper
industry and the mechanisms through which the media can influence
public enforcement of the AML. Part III describes the methodology
and data used in analyzing the cases. Part IV uses two high-profile
antitrust investigations to illustrate how the NDRC strategically
manipulated the supply of media content and successfully mobilized
18. BENJAMIN L. LIEBMAN, Changing Media, Changing Courts, in CHANGING MEDIA,
CHANGING CHINA 151 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011).
19. Daniela Stockmann & Mary E. Gallagher, Remote Control: How the Media Sustain
Authoritarian Rule in China, 44 COMP. POL. STUD. 1, 23 (2011).
20. William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions
in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 409-13(1997).
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public sentiment to push forward its investigations. Part V analyzes
the disincentives among Chinese antitrust lawyers and academics to
voice criticisms over antitrust intervention. In particular, it performs a
content study of the incident involving the dismissal of Zhang
Xinzhu, a renowned antitrust expert, from a government advisory
committee. Part VI turns to the demand side bias and analyzes how
populist concerns could drive media coverage of antitrust
investigations. It studies the editorial slant in three RPM
investigations and a merger review involving Coca-Cola’s attempted
acquisition of a well-known domestic brand. Part VII concludes.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The Chinese media was once called “the mouth and tongue” of
the party. 21 Liebman observes that the industry is subject to regulation
by a complicated “web of formal and informal regulation.” 22 In 2016,
Reporters Without Borders ranked China 176th out of 180 countries in
its index of press freedom. 23 The Freedom House called China “one
of the world’s most restrictive media environments” and gave it a
press freedom score of 87 out of 100 (with 100 being the worst) in
2016. 24 Meanwhile, China also has one of the world’s most dynamic
media markets, and its advertising expenditure ranked only after the
United States in 2015. 25
Chinese media went through significant transformations in
several rounds of reform. The first reform carried out in the 1990s led
to the commercialization of many newspapers that focus on reporting
financial and economic news. 26 Unlike party newspapers, which are
still tightly controlled by the local communist party organization and
propaganda departments, many commercial newspapers have become
21. Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese System,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (2005); SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 85 (2007).
22. Liebman, supra note 21, at 41.
23 REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, 2016 WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX,,
https://rsf.org/en/ranking [https://perma.cc/VGB9-MA38] (last visited Nov. 1, 2017).
24. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2016, FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/china [https://perma.cc/VVT3-QZQ8] (last
visited Jan. 4, 2018).
25. STATISTA, ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE IN THE WORLD’S LARGEST AD MARKETS IN
2015 (IN BILLION U.S. DOLLARS), STATISTA.COM, http://www.statista.com/statistics/
273736/advertising-expenditure-in-the-worlds-largest-ad-markets/ [https://perma.cc/9FWL-HL
B2] (last visited Jan 4., 2018].
26. Piotroski et al., supra note 17.
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self-sufficient and no longer rely on financial support from the
government. 27 The other large-scale reforms involved the
conglomeration of selected newspapers into newly created media
groups. 28 Although commercialized newspapers are still subject to
political control by the Chinese government, they are financially
driven and compete for audiences by appealing to their tastes and
demands. 29
Generally speaking, Chinese newspapers are divided into three
categories: official newspapers, semi-official newspapers, and
commercialized newspapers. 30 Official newspapers receive indirect
subsidiaries through subscription by government units. 31 In contrast,
semiofficial and commercialized newspapers are completely financed
through advertising, with the latter partially privatized, while the
former is not. 32 All newspapers continue to be registered under state
organization and are subject to close state scrutiny. 33 Editors and
journalists generally perceive the official papers as experts on the
position of the government while unofficial papers voice public
opinion. 34 Nonofficial media thus have more credibility, and this in
turn improves their ability to influence public opinion. 35 At the same
time, the commercialization of the media and the emergence of the
internet has revolutionized the way that the Chinese Communist Party
leadership and the citizens interact during the public policy making
process. 36 As the internet becomes an important platform for Chinese
citizens to voice grievances and participate in public affairs, the
Chinese government is learning to be more responsive and adaptive in
the digital environment. 37

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
DANIELA STOCKMANN, MEDIA COMMERCIALIZATION AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE
IN CHINA 67-68 (2013).
31. See DANIELA STOCKMANN, What Kind of Information Does the Public Demand?
Getting the News during the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING
CHINA 179 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011).
32. Id.
33. Stockmann & Gallagher, supra note 19, at 6.
34. STOCKMANN, supra note 31, at 180.
35. Id. at 181-82.
36. See generally Xiao Qiang, The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political
Impact, in CHANGING MEDIA, CHANGING CHINA, 203 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011).
37. Id. at 222-23.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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There are several mechanisms through which the media can
influence Chinese antitrust enforcement. First, economists have
argued that profit-maximizing media can help overcome the rational
ignorance problem of voters. 38 By collecting, verifying, and
summarizing relevant facts, the media mitigates the collective action
problem associated with gathering information for a dispersed
group. 39 Many Chinese SOEs hold entrenched and vested interests in
concentrated industry sectors in China. 40 Meanwhile, these SOEs also
enjoy superior bureaucratic and political status, and they have more
convenient channels through which to lobby, making it more difficult
and costly for antitrust agencies to bring actions against them. 41
However, the media can help inform the public about antitrust policy,
empowering the policy entrepreneurs to mobilize public sentiment in
order to challenge such concentrated interests. 42 As illustrated in Part
IV regarding the NDRC’s media campaign, news coverage of Chinese
antitrust enforcement was driven not only by the intrinsic appeal of
each piece of news, but also by the efforts exerted by the regulator.
Second, if a Chinese state-controlled media strongly endorses an
antitrust intervention, this sends a political signal that the
administrative intervention has gained endorsement from higher
levels of the government. It also causes speculation that the Chinese
government is tightening its regulation of an industry, with antitrust
intervention being one of its tools to achieve its policy objectives, as
illustrated in the Infant Formula Case elaborated in Section IV.B.
below. Thus, if a firm vigorously defends itself, it might not only be
viewed as defying the antitrust agency, but might also provoke the
Chinese government for thwarting its policy objectives. This fear of
provocation, coupled with the weak legal institutions and the lack of
judicial oversight over agency action, exerts pressures on firms to
conform to the antitrust agency’s demand.
Third, Chinese media not only plays the role as a party
mouthpiece but is also an information gatherer and watchdog for the
Party. 43 Political scientists have long identified the function of the
38. Alexander Dyck et al., Media versus Special Interest, 56 J. L. ECON. 521 (2013).
39. Id.
40. Angela Huyue Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan, Is Antitrust Regulation A
False Hope, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 195, 207-11 (2015).
41. Id.
42. See Dyck et al, supra note 38.
43. YUEZHI ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: BETWEEN THE PARTY
LINE AND THE BOTTOM LINE (1998).
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Chinese media as a bottom-up information transmission system,
which helps the party leaders gather intelligence and monitor the
performance of lower-level government officials. 44 Moreover, as the
actions of the Chinese antitrust agencies are seldom tested in court,
popular support is an important means through which Chinese
enforcement agencies can obtain legitimacy for their actions. The
endorsement from the public helps the agency gain political credit
from within the bureaucracy. It also helps the agency overcome the
political opposition that it faces when tackling large SOEs, as
illustrated in the China Telecom Case in Section IV.A. below.
Fourth, consumer product firms operating in China are sensitive
to the negative publicity brought by antitrust investigations. As
suggested by Dyck and Zingales, the effectiveness of the media
depends on two essential characteristics of the institutional
environment. First, public shaming works when society as a whole
takes a negative view of the conduct exposed by the press. 45 Second,
the magnitude of the penalty depends on the frequency and
importance of business’ interactions with the consumers, the capital
market, and the government. 46 The Chinese market has long been
plagued by concerns about poor quality and counterfeits. A good
reputation is therefore expensive to establish in China. An antitrust
investigation of a firm could tarnish the brand image that these firms
have worked hard to cultivate, leaving consumers with the impression
that they have been “ripped off.” Thus, Chinese consumer product
firms will most likely suffer as a result of the negative publicity after
the exposure of their involvement in an antitrust investigation.
Ironically, the less market power that a firm has, the more that it fears
the damage to its reputation because consumers can easily turn to
other brands as substitutes. This is particularly the case for companies
involved in RPM investigation. The vast majority of these cases that
the NDRC has investigated so far involve consumer product firms
operating in highly competitive markets. These companies are
therefore the most vulnerable to negative publicity brought by media
coverage of their cases, as illustrated in Section VI.A. below.

44. Id.
45. DYCK et al., supra note 11, at 1101.
46. Id. at 1102.
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III. METHODOLOGY
In order to examine the role of the media and its effects on
antitrust enforcement, I collected all the investigations that were
conducted by the Chinese antitrust agencies from the inception of the
AML to the end of 2015. 47 I include only closed cases and those in
which there were public disclosures of the NDRC’s investigations, as
sometimes the agency did not make any disclosure of its investigation
or decision. 48 I then used WiseNews to search for the relevant news
reports covering these cases between the first public disclosure of the
case and the date before the agency released its decision. 49 WiseNews
collects news reports from a wide range of general interest Chinese
newspapers published in mainland China. 50 Within the relevant search
period, I found six that attracted over 100 media reports on
WiseNews. These include the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Case, the China
Telecom/China Unicom, the White Liquor Case, the Infant Formula
Case, the Auto Part Case, and the Qualcomm case. A summary of
each of these cases is provided in Annex I. Among these six cases,
one is a merger case, two are abuse of dominance cases, and three
involve RPM. With the exception of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Case, all
five other cases were investigated by the NDRC. As Qualcomm is not
a consumer product firm and does not directly interact with end
consumers, I expected that the firm would be less sensitive to media
coverage. Thus, in the Qualcomm case, I did not study the whole
period of the media coverage, but rather the pertinent period
involving the dismissal of Zhang Xinzhu, an eminent antitrust expert
from a government advisory committee.
I then performed content analysis of the relevant news articles in
the sample.51 I included only those articles that focus on discussing
47 . I rely on the information disclosed on the websites of the three main Chinese
antitrust enforcement agencies to collect the information about the investigations. It should be
noted, however, sometimes the Chinese agencies did not publicize some of their investigations
so there is no public record of these cases.
48. Angela Huyue Zhang, Strategic Public Shaming: Evidence from Chinese Antitrust,
CHINA QUARTERLY (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2943268 [https://perma.cc/W9PW-4S45] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
49. For all these searches, I limited my search on news articles published by media
outlets in mainland China.
50. WiseNews’ database is http://wisenews.wisers.net/wisenews/index.do? [https://perm
a.cc/E7FL-PAN8 ] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
51. In the Qualcomm case, as the inquiry is about dismissal of Zhang Xinzhu, I focus on
the media coverage between the first public disclosure of the dismissal of Zhang to the date
before the release of the Qualcomm decision.
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the investigations, excluding those that made only passing reference
to these cases. A summary statistics of the number of relevant articles
and the number of media outlets of these four cases are presented in
Table 1 below.
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF ARTICLES AND MEDIA OUTLETS
IN WISENEWS

Case

Articles
(N)

Media
Outlets (N)

Coca-Cola

272

158

Sep. 3, 2008 to March 17,
2009

China
Telecom/China
Unicom

202

75

9 Nov. 2011 to 1 Dec. 2011

White Liquor

101

48

Jan. 15, 2013 to Feb. 18,
2013

Infant Formula

502

91

June 27, 2013 to August 6,
2013

Auto Part

257

74

July 26, 2014 to August 12,
2014

Qualcomm
(the Zhang
Xinzhu incident)

60

44

August 12, 2014 to Feb. 9,
2015

Total

1394

n/a

n/a

Search Window

I read through each article, which allowed me to reconstruct the
details of how the NDRC strategically leaked the existence of its
investigation to state-controlled media, how the public reacted to such
disclosure, how the media covered the investigation, whether it
interviewed any industry or legal experts, and how the experts
commented on the case, as well as the subsequent responses from the
investigated firms, the regulator, and other media outlets. I used a
mixture of inductive and deductive coding, beginning with themes
that I expected to be reported based on my previous reading of the
news coverage on these antitrust investigations, but I also added new
codes as they emerged from the media analysis. I then documented
the major theme of each article, how the news was framed, the origin
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and the institutional affiliations of the sources cited in the article, how
the sources commented on the investigation, and the general tone of
the article.
IV. THE NDRC’S MEDIA CAMPAIGN
China currently has three main antitrust enforcement agencies.
The NDRC and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(“SAIC”) are jointly responsible for the enforcement against
anticompetitive conducts, whereas MOFCOM is responsible for
merger control. In recent years, the NDRC has emerged as a more
powerful regulator and its hectic enforcement actions have dwarfed
SAIC. As of the end of 2016, the antitrust bureau within the NDRC,
formally titled the Anti-Monopoly and Price Supervision Bureau, had
launched investigations against many prominent targets, including
national state-owned giants such as China Telecom and China
Unicom, local state-owned champions such as Maotai and Wuliangye,
and leading multinational companies in a wide range of industries
ranging from infant formula to auto manufacturers to chip makers. At
the same time, the SAIC’s enforcement activities did not attract much
public attention, with the exception of its investigations into
Microsoft and Tetra Pack.
Notably, the NDRC is the only one among the three enforcement
agencies that has been seen to actively and consciously utilize a
media strategy during antitrust enforcement actions. During the tenure
of Xu Kunlin, the NDRC officials appeared twice on Dialogue, a
CCTV talk show, to publicize their enforcement activities. On August
25, 2013, Xu appeared on Dialogue to discuss his agency’s
experience in investigating three high-profile cases including the
Infant Formula, the Gold Retailer, and White Liquor Cases. 52 The
audience in the show all appeared to be officials from the antitrust
unit. 53 An executive from Wyeth, an infant formula producer
investigated in 2013, also appeared on the show to publicly announce
its determination to reduce prices in conformity with the NDRC’s
request. 54 Wyeth’s proactive cooperation ultimately won it full
52. CCTV, Fanlongduan Shifou Neng Hanwei Women De Liyi [Could Antitrust Defend
Our Interest], Duihua [Dialogue] (August 25, 2013), http://tv.cntv.cn/video/C10316/723a171
54d2940bbb913ed2c38901064 [https://perma.cc/H4UH-J933] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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immunity from fines. 55 On February 15, 2015, Xu and his team
appeared on the Dialogue show again, highlighting the challenges that
the NDRC received in response to the Qualcomm investigation. 56 Xu
first tried to rebut the challenges from foreign media sources, arguing
that it had not discriminated against foreign multinational companies
during its antitrust enforcement. 57 He also firmly denied the
allegations of due process violations during antitrust investigations. 58
TV appearances such as these not only serve to raise public awareness
of the AML, but also help the NDRC establish its legal authority and
legitimacy. In addition to TV interviews, Xu also accepted many
interviews with various newspapers and magazines. For instance, in
June 2015, Xu Kunlin accepted an interview with a magazine in
which he discussed the negotiation with Qualcomm at length. 59
During the second Dialogue show, Xu admitted that the NDRC
had kept a low profile during many cases that it had investigated out
of concern of “double penalty.” 60 He explained that many firms
requested that the NDRC not publicize their cases for fear of the
reputational sanctions on these firms. 61 However, in three cases, the
NDRC acted as a whistle blower by strategically leaking information
to the state media. In both the China Telecom/China Unicom Case
and the Infant Formula Case, the agency announced its investigations
on the CCTV.62 Additionally, in a case involving a number of gold
retailers, the NDRC first leaked its investigation to People’s Daily. 63
As illustrated in the case studies below, such strategic leakage helps
the agency gain the first mover advantage in framing the media
55. Ye Bihua, Fagaiwei Shiyi Huishi Mianzao Zhongfa: Shouxian Jiangjia Shuaixian
Rencuo [NDRC Explained Why Wyeth Got Exemptions From Penalties: Wyeth Was The First
One To Reduce Price], XINLANG CAIJING [SINA FIN.] (August 8, 2013), http://
finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130808/022816379184.shtml [https://perma.cc/Z6PA93XP] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) .
56. CCTV, Fanlongduan Zhenxiang [The Truth of Antitrust] (Feb. 15, 2015), http://jingj
i.cntv.cn/2015/02/16/VIDE1424029494651330.shtml [https://perma.cc/7JY2-VVML] (last
visited Jan. 4, 2018).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Xinhua Net, Guojia Fagaiwei Jiagesi Sizhang Xu Kunlin: Qingli Zhongda Fang
Londuan An [Kunlin Xu from the Price Bureau of NDRC: The Experiences of High Profile
Antitrust Investigation] (June 20, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20150620/213322
484073.shtml [https://perma.cc/MMD7-BS4R] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
60. CCTV, supra note 56.
61. Id.
62. Zhang, supra note 48.
63. Id.
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discussions about the cases and shaping the tones for subsequent
outlets. Firms under investigation can also launch a countervailing
media campaign, which occurred in the China Telecom/China
Unicom case. However, even if these two SOEs could use other statecontrolled media to defend their conduct, this did not seem to change
the negative perception held by the public against these two SOEs.
Meanwhile, in the Infant Formula Case, the investigated firms all
avoided the media and none of them made any attempt to defend
themselves.
A. China Telecom/China Unicom
On November 9, 2011, 30 Minutes News, a CCTV program,
began by referring to a recent report prepared by the National
Telecommunication Expert Committee (Expert Report). 64 The Expert
Report noted that China’s internet speed ranks 71st in the world, less
than one-tenth of the average speed of the OECD countries, while
costing two or three times more. 65 Then, Li Qing, a deputy director
general at the antitrust unit of the NDRC emerged, announcing that
her agency had been investigating two large telecommunication
firms—China Telecom and China Unicom—for antitrust violations
(the China Telecom and China Unicom case). 66 Ms. Li claimed that
these two SOEs had a dominant market position and that they
together held over two-thirds of the market shares in the internet
access market. 67 According to her, these two SOEs had conducted
price discrimination against rival companies—if these facts were to
be ultimately proven true, these two firms could be subject to a fine of
1-10% of the fiscal revenue, potentially up to RMB 8 billion for these
two SOEs. 68 In addition to the antitrust allegations, Ms. Li asserted
that these two SOEs had not achieved full integration, thus increasing
the cost of internet access for internet service providers. 69 The CCTV
program also quoted some estimates from the Expert Report, stating
64. See CCTV, Fagaiwei Zheng Diaocha Zhongguo Dianxin He Zhongguo Liantong
Shexian Longduan [The NDRC Is Investigating the Broadband Monopoly Issues of China
Telecom and China Unicom], XINLANG CAIJING [SINA FIN.] (Nov. 9, 2011), http://finance.si
na.com.cn/g/20111109/121510782543.shtml [https://perma.cc/PR8R-J7VD] (last visited Jan.
4, 2018).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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that the internet access price will decrease 27% to 38% in five years if
the relevant market becomes truly competitive, saving RMB ten
billion to RMB fifteen billion for Chinese consumers. 70 Ms. Li did not
explain how the internet speed is related to the price discrimination
conduct at issue, but her announcement left the impression that the
abusive behavior of these two SOEs had led to the high internet prices
and low internet speed for Chinese consumers.
The NDRC’s announcement on the CCTV caught both SOEs by
surprise. Both companies immediately released clarification
statements to their investors in response to the NDRC’s
announcement. 71 In their statements, both SOEs alleged that they had
been operating in accordance with the law and were actively
cooperating with the NDRC’s investigations. 72 As later revealed in a
Xinhua report, the NDRC had, in fact, started to investigate China
Telecom and China Unicom seven months ago. 73 By June 2011, the
NDRC had reached a preliminary conclusion that these two SOEs had
abused their monopolies in the relevant market, and the two SOEs
subsequently submitted their feedback reports. 74 But the investigation
was kept strictly confidential during that time, and employees needed
to sign their testimonies after interviews with the NDRC. 75 According
to the Xinhua News, the NDRC held a meeting with the Legal
Department of the State Council, the Supreme People’s Court, and the
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (“MIIT”) on
October 17, 2011. 76 During the meeting, the NDRC’s proposal was
met with significant opposition from these departments due to
concern over the controversy, and they urged the NDRC to not reach
its conclusion hastily before gathering solid evidence. 77 During the
70. Id.
71. Zhongguo Lianhe Wangluo Tongxin Gufen Youxian Gongsi Chengqing Gonggao
[Public Clarification Notice of China Unicom], CNINFO.COM.CN (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2011-11-10/60183823.PDF
[https://perma.cc/PKW2R3TL] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018); Zhongguo Dianxin Gufen Youxian Gongsi Gaogong [Public
Notice of China Telecom], HKEXNEWS.HK (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.chinatelecom-h.com/tc/
regulatory/announcements/a111109.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJF6-R7T2 ] (last visited Jan. 17,
2018).
72. Id.
73. Dahua Liu, Weiguan Fanlongduan Shou An [Examining The First Big Antitrust
Case], XINHUA (Nov. 11, 2011), http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2011-11-11/19476309150.shtml
[https://perma.cc/XS23-9VZH] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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meeting, the NDRC promised that it would solicit further feedback
from the State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration
Commission (“SASAC”) and the MIIT before submitting its report to
the State Council. 78
Thus, the NDRC’s announcement on the CCTV not only sent a
shock to the SOEs, but also to the SASAC, the MIIT, and other
government departments that were involved and consulted during the
investigation. According to the Xinhua News, the surprise
announcement on the CCTV was a deliberate tactic adopted by the
NDRC in response to the arrogant attitude displayed by these two
SOEs. 79 Interviews with the NDRC officials corroborate the news
report. Insiders note that the NDRC faced significant opposition not
only from the SOEs, but also the other bureaucratic departments,
including the SASAC, which was concerned about the potential loss
of state assets, and the MIIT, which was concerned that the NDRC
was encroaching on its turf. 80 By leaking the news to the CCTV, the
NDRC hoped that public opinion against these two SOEs would in
turn exert pressure on these two firms, making it more difficult for
other bureaucratic departments to intervene in the matter. 81
The NDRC’s announcement on the CCTV caused a sensation in
the Chinese media. In WiseNews, I identified fifty-eight news articles
from fifty-one media outlets covering the investigation the day after
the NDRC’s announcement. As the CCTV was the first to report this
investigation, almost all news articles (with only one exception) relied
heavily on the information disclosed by the CCTV and extensively
quoted the remarks by Li. Among these reports, eighty-five percent
quoted experts expressing enthusiastic support for the NDRC’s
actions. For instance, Wang Xiaoye, a prominent antitrust expert in
China, said that she was very pleased to see that the NDRC initiated
this investigation. 82 Hailing the case as the first antitrust investigation
of Chinese SOEs, Professor Wang said that the case set a milestone in

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Zhang, supra note 40, at 218-20.
81. Interview with a NDRC official in Beijing (June 2016).
82. Xiaofang Ma & Liqing Guo, Liantong Dianxin Yiwai Zao Diaocha, Fanlongduan
Shou Han Yangqi [China Telecom and China Unicom Were Subject to a Surprise
Investigation, the First Attack on State-Owned Enterprises under the Antimonopoly Law], DIYI
CAIJING RIBAO [CHINA BUSINESS NEWS] (Nov. 10, 2011), http://finance.qq.com/a/20111110/
000224.htm [https://perma.cc/P2CR-AZ7M] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
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Chinese antitrust enforcement. 83 Only five reports quoted industry
experts who expressed doubts or confusion over the NDRC’s
investigation. 84 For instance, Yangcheng Evening News, a newspaper
based in Guangzhou, interviewed several telecom experts who said
that they were confused by the NDRC’s investigation. 85 They said
that the prices of broadband access had not increased significantly in
recent years, and that broadband access in small Chinese cities is not
very expensive. Thus, telecom should not constitute major antitrust
concerns. 86
With almost all news outlets relying heavily on the NDRC and
the CCTV as sources, and the vast majority of experts endorsing the
investigation, the editorial slant is unsurprisingly very skewed against
the SOEs. Among the fifty-eight news reports released on the day
after the NDRC’s announcement, sixty seven percent carry a negative
tone against the telecom firms, either by presenting one-sided
allegations from the NDRC or by firmly endorsing the government’s
action as a major breakthrough in antitrust enforcement. Public
opinion was also overwhelming negative towards the SOEs. A survey
conducted by Sina Weibo, the Chinese Twitter, on the day of the
NDRC’s announcement shows that ninety-six percent of the
participants believed that these two SOEs held dominant positions in
the broadband market and that eighty-seven percent of the
participants were dissatisfied with their performance. 87 Another
survey conducted by China Comment reveals that ninety four percent
of the 6,400 participants who participated in an online survey on the
day after the NDRC’s announcement believed that these two SOEs

83. Id.
84. The news outlets that quoted negative comments from experts include SOUTHERN
DAILY, DAILY SUNSHINE, YANGCHENG EVENING NEWS, SHANTOU DAILY, and SHANTOU
METRO NEWS, all of which are based in Guangdong province.
85. Jing Xu, Liantong Dianxing Shouzao Fanlongduan Diaocha, Yenei Hu Bujie Yewai
Jiaokou Zan [China Telecom and China Unicom Were Subject to Antitrust Investigation,
Telecom Experts Expressed Doubts While the Public Applauded], YANGCHENG WANGBAO
[YANGCHENG EVENING NEWS] (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.sohu.com/20111110/n3252051
04.shtml [https://perma.cc/W69C-4R4R] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
86. Id.
87. Yuat Yue, Fagaiwei Zhi Dianxin Liantong Shexian Longduan, Ying Weiguan, Gejie
Fanying Buyi [NDRC Alleged China Telecom and China Unicom Were Monopolies, Mixed
Feedback from Different Sides], RENMING WANG [RENMING NET], (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/16191006.html [https://perma.cc/9975-BKNB] (last visited
Jan. 4, 2018).
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had committed antitrust violations. 88 The results indicating public
opinion are not surprising. The Chinese public have long loathed
large Chinese SOEs, who are often considered villains that are
causing all sorts of problems in the Chinese economy. 89 On the other
hand, the overwhelming public support for the NDRC’s actions also
reveals the presence of confirmation bias among the Chinese public.
Even without any solid evidence, the Chinese public is eager to take a
mere announcement by an antitrust agency of its investigation into the
SOEs as evidence of the firms’ antitrust violations.
Two days after the NDRC’s announcement of its investigation
into China Telecom and China Unicom, the Xinhua News published a
lengthy report, calling the NDRC’s investigation a fight among deities
that was irrelevant for Chinese consumers. 90 A lawyer from a
consumer association was quoted in the report, condemning the
NDRC’s surprise announcement on the CCTV as an inappropriate
move that “lack[ed] careful consideration.” 91 He asserted that since
the case had not been resolved, such an announcement was unfair to
the investigated firms and could result in adverse social
consequences. 92 As Xinhua is also a leading official newspaper
owned by the central government, the criticisms quoted in the Xinhua
report sent a strong signal of the dissonance within the bureaucracy
over the NDRC’s action. The Xinhua report also quoted other
skepticisms expressed by many telecom industry experts over the
antitrust investigation. For instance, Wu Songning, the editor in chief
from People’s Post and Telecommunication News (“PPTN”) clarified
that the case actually involved the internet service provider (“ISP”)
access market, rather than the broadband market as announced by the
NDRC. 93 He observed that the competition in the ISP market is very
fierce, with over 700 ISP competing in the same market. 94 Notably,
PPTN is owned by the MIIT, a telecom regulator that was concerned
that the NDRC’s investigation was encroaching on its turf. The
88. Editorial, Fanlongduan Shou An [The First Antitrust Case], CHINA COMMENT (Nov.
11, 2011), http://news.hangzhou.com.cn/jjxw/content/2011-11/11/content_3954157_2.htm [htt
ps://perma.cc/7M94-ZRDX] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
89. See generally SHENG HONG & ZHAO NING, CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:
NATURE, PERFORMANCE AND REFORM (2012).
90. Liu, supra note 73.
91. See Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Xinhua report also hinted that many telecom experts were reluctant to
comment on the antitrust investigation, suggesting the sensitive nature
of the matter. 95
On November 11, 2011, the PPTN released an editorial on its
front page entitled “Confusing Facts, Misleading Public,” directly
rebutting the CCTV’s report. 96 It began by noting that the NDRC’s
surprised announcement distressed employees working at these two
SOEs and caused the stock prices of these two SOEs to tumble. 97 It
then outlined four misleading facts presented in the CCTV program.
First, the CCTV program misled the public, as the case in fact
concerned the ISP access market, a much smaller market than the
broadband market, which was the market initially reported to be
involved. 98 Second, the CCTV program also misled the public into
believing that China Telecom and China Unicom held dominant
positions in the ISP market, but this is factually wrong, as the market
is highly competitive with many other players. 99 Third, these two
SOEs did not conduct any price discrimination—they charged
different prices to different firms on the basis of product
differentiations, rather than price discrimination. 100 Finally, the
CCTV’s mention of China’s slow broadband speed as compared with
that of the OECD is irrelevant to the current antitrust investigation. 101
Additionally, the editorial argued that it was unfair to compare the
internet speed in China with those in advanced countries—a fairer
comparison would be to measure China against developing countries
such as India and Russia. 102 The editorial also severely criticized the
lack of professional standards in the CCTV coverage, which caused
severe reputational and financial harm to these two SOEs. 103 On the
same day, Telecommunication Industry News, another newspaper
95. Id.
96. Xiaoya & Yangyang, Huanxiao Shiting, Wudao Gongzhong: Bo Yangshi Dui
Dianxing Liantong Shexian Jiage Longduan de Baodao [Confusing and Misleading the
Public: Rebutting CCTV’s Coverage over the alleged Price Monopoly of China Telecom and
China Unicom], RENMIN YOUDIAN BAO [PEOPLE’S POST AND TELECOMMUNICATION NEWS]
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/46369.html [https://perma.cc/4AWN-D68Z]
(last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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owned by the MIIT, also published an editorial criticizing the CCTV
report on the investigation. 104 It argued that even if these two SOEs
held a dominant position in the ISP access market, dominance in itself
did not constitute a violation of the AML. 105
The skepticism portrayed in the Xinhua News and the fierce
rebuttal launched by the two MIIT newspapers ignited another round
of debate over this case in state-controlled media. On November 11,
2011, the Economic Information Daily, an influential businessoriented newspaper owned by the Xinhua News, published an
investigative report that severely condemned the conduct of China
Telecom and defended the NDRC’s action.106 The author asserted that
China Telecom had abused its dominant position and suggested that
the abusive conduct by China Telecom had resulted in broadband
prices for Chinese enterprises that were more than four times as much
as those in the United States. 107 According to the report, China
Telecom conducted price discrimination in selling bandwidth to
different ISPs and charged those larger ISPs much higher fees than
the smaller ISPs. 108 However, China Telecom soon realized that its
differential pricing scheme led to arbitrage opportunities, as small
ISPs packaged their bandwidth and resold it to large ones. 109 After
detecting this, China Telecom issued a notice to its subsidiaries in
August 2010 prohibiting resale by small ISPs. 110 This action resulted
in the blackout of internet access for many large ISPs, who relied on
the cheaper bandwidth sold by small ISPs. 111 One of the companies
that suffered a significant loss is China Railcom, a subsidiary of
China Mobile, one of the three major state-owned telecom firms. 112
104. Gongxin Bu Xiashu Liangjia Meiti Bo Dianxin Liantong Shexian Longduan Baodao
[Two Newspapers Owned by MIIT Rebutted the Media Coverage over the Antitrust Violation
of China Telecom and China Unicom], XINJIN BAO [BEIJING NEWS], (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://www.chinanews.com/it/2011/11-12/3455659.shtml [https://perma.cc/EVM2-T9NF] (last
visited Jan. 4, 2018).
105. Id.
106. Editoral, Zhongguo Dianxin Weihe Zaoyu Fanlongduan Diaocha [Why Was China
Telecom Subject to Antitrust Investigation], JINGJI CANKAO BAO [ECON. INFORMATION
DAILY], (last updated Nov. 11, 2011), http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20111111/07031079664
9.shtml [https://perma.cc/69QP-EYMC] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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On November 14, 2011, People’s Daily published an editorial
that asserted that the case was not a fight between commercial deities,
but rather an investigation that concerned the interests of millions of
Chinese consumers.113 It reiterated the message sent in the CCTV that
if the market competition became effective, the prices for internet
access would increase 27-38% for consumers, saving ten billion or
fifteen billion yuan for Chinese consumers. 114 Moreover, the nonintegration of these two SOEs not only affected the speed of the
Internet, but also the cost of internet access. 115 This editorial seems to
be a direct rebuttal of the earlier Xinhua editorial which cast doubt
upon the NDRC’s action. On November 15, 2011, the CCTV
produced another TV program in response to the attack from the
SOEs, inviting a number of telecom and legal experts to comment on
the case. 116 Gao Hongbing, a telecom expert, was quoted as stating
that these two telecom firms’ antitrust violations were solidly
proven. 117 He rebutted the allegation that the investigation is
unrelated to consumer interests, noting that the failure of these two
telecom firms to fully integrate directly harms the interests of tens of
millions of consumers. 118 On November 21, 2011, the People’s Daily
published another editorial, entitled “Applauding the NDRC’s
Actions,” firmly endorsing the NDRC’s intervention. 119 The editorial
approvingly declared that the NDRC’s action not only appealed to the
popular demand of the Chinese people, but also set a milestone in
Chinese antitrust enforcement.120

113. Chenchen, Lanlongduan Diaocha Bushi Shenxian Zhan [Antitrust Investigation Is
Not A Fight Among Deities], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://tech.ifeng.com/telecom/special/fanlongduan/content-1/detail_2011_11/14/10634305_0.s
html [https://perma.cc/44M8-JBWH] (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Ma Xiaofang, Fanlongduan Xulun Zhan Di’er Chang: Yanshi Wang Quanmian
Fanji [The Second Antitrust Media Fight : The Combat of the CCTV], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO,
[CHINA BUSINESS NEWS] (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.c114.net/news/16/a656077.html [https:
//perma.cc/9DMV-ZXDN] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119 . Xiaoyan, Renmin Ribao Wei Fagaiwei Jiaohao, Kending Diaocha Dianxin
Liantong [Renmin Ribao Cheered for NDRC, Approving Its Investigation of China Telecom
and China Unicom], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Nov. 21, 2011),
http://news.qq.com/a/20111121/000110.htm [https://perma.cc/HU7J-3ER3] (archived on Jan.
4, 2018).
120. Id.
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On December 2, 2011, the PPTN published another editorial,
again attacking the CCTV’s report about the comparison of the
broadband access price with other countries. 121 However, on the same
day, both China Telecom and China Unicom formally requested the
suspension of from the NDRC’s investigation. 122 Both issued
statements on their remedial proposal, promising to rectify their
discriminatory conduct, to increase integration with other network,
and to increase internet speed while lowering the cost for internet
access in China. 123 The NDRC responded the next day,
acknowledging the receipt of such a suspension request. However,
there was no further disclosure regarding the matter and no fine was
imposed on these two firms. It thus appeared that the dispute was
resolved within the internal bureaucracy. Moreover, the
countervailing efforts by the two SOEs did not seem to change public
opinion. According to the polling results by Global Times, as of
November 18, 2011, over 80% of the online participants believed that
the conduct of China Telecom and China Unicom had constituted
antitrust violation; seventy percent were not satisfied with their
broadband services; and thirty percent believed that the antitrust
investigation would help them address the problems that they met
during broadband access. 124
The China Telecom/China Unicom case demonstrates the
powerful feedback loop among the regulator, the Chinese media, and
the Party. The NDRC’s strategic leakage of its investigation over the
CCTV created nationwide common knowledge about the case. The
stimulated responses to these reports mobilized public sentiments.
Such sentiments were then expressed through various online and print
121. Zhou Ling, Liang Gongsi Zhong Rencuo, Dianxin Liantong Shenqing Zhongzhi
Fanlongduan Diaocha [Two Companies Finally Admitted Guilt, China Telecom and China
Unicom Applied to Suspension of Antitrust Investigation], DONGFANG ZAOBAO ORIENTAL
MORNING POST (Dec. 3, 2013), http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2011/12/03080211715510.shtml
[https://perma.cc/RNU5-V89L] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
122. Id.
123 . Liu Yuying, Zhongguo Dianxin He Zhongguo Liantong Shenqing Zhongduan
Fanlongduan Diaocha [China Telecom and China Unicom Applied for Suspension of Antitrust
Investigation], CHINANEWS.COM, (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.chinanews.com/it/2011/12-02/
3505203.shtml [https://perma.cc/7FD4-4EFJ] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
124. Nie Lubing, Bacheng Shoufang Wangyou Renwei Dianxin Liantong Longduan,
Huyu Diaocha Shiyou Hangye [Over 80% of Those Who Participated Online Believed China
Telecom and China Unicom Had Committed Antitrust Violation, Calling for Antitrust
Investigation of the Oil Industry], HUANGQIU SHIBAO [GLOBAL TIMES] (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://china.huanqiu.com/roll/2011-11/2164617.html [https://perma.cc/47TJ-KNZG] (archived
on Jan. 4, 2018).
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media, which were then communicated back to the Party leaders. As
Shirk points out, the Party leaders, whose paramount priority is to
maintain social stability, pays close attention to the media and the
public opinion as reflected in those news reports.125 The endorsement
from the public thus helps the NDRC remove the political obstacles
when tackling cases, making it more difficult for opponents to
challenge its actions.
Despite the overwhelming public endorsement, it was never
clear whether the NDRC had a legitimate basis to bring such a case
and whether it benefited consumers, as the NDRC had claimed. As
the case was suspended and no public information was revealed, there
is very little the public could learn about this case. One commentator
lamented in a Southern Metropolis Newspaper article, questioning
whether the NDRC would have brought such a case had it not been a
turf war among several state-owned telecom SOEs.126
B. The Infant Formula Case
Two years later, the NDRC applied the same tactic again in a
RPM case involving nine infant formula producers. On July 1, 2013,
the CCTV announced that it received confirmation from the NDRC
that it was investigating Biostime and a few other manufacturers of
infant formula. 127 This is the earliest media confirmation of the
NDRC’s investigation, suggesting that the NDRC first leaked the
news to the CCTV. The CCTV News quoted a report published on
Biostime’s website, noting that Biostime is the largest player in the
premium infant formula in China 2011, holding over forty-four
percent of market shares. 128 Also, its infant formula business grew
rapidly and increased more than sixty one percent than the previous
year, with its infant formula business now accounting for eighty
125. SUSAN SHIRK, Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy, in CHANGING MEDIA,
CHANGING CHINA 239 (Susan L. Shirk ed., 2011).
126. Ruan Ziwen, Dianxin Fanlongduan Diaocha Yinggai Huigui Falv Benyi [Antitrust
Investigation of China Telecom Should Return to the Meaning of Law], NANFANG DUSHI BAO
[SOUTHERN METROPOLIS] (Nov. 14, 2011), http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2011-11-14/0732631510
4.shtml [https://perma.cc/HQ4U-UZB6] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
127 . CCTV, Fazhan Gaigewei Dui Heshengyuan Deng Rufen Qiye Fanlongduan
Diaocha [NDRC Launched Antitrust Investigation Into Biostime and Other Milk Powder
Companies], CHINA NETWORK TELEVISION (July 1, 2013), http://tv.cntv.cn/vodplay/
015c07df1972448e915602c6c74c20b2/860010-1102010100 [https://perma.cc/Q9DF-2CLC]
(last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
128. Id.
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percent of its overall revenue in 2012. 129 The TV report also mentions
that Biostime had disclosed the NDRC’s investigation a few days
earlier, causing a significant blow to its stock prices. 130 One the same
day, China Broadcast Net, a newspaper owned by the CCTV,
published an article on its website confirming the same facts. 131 The
article also reports the phenomenon of an abnormal price increase in
the infant formula market in recent years, with prices of foreign infant
formula milk powders increasing by fifty percent from 2008 to
2013. 132 It states that the prices of infant formula powder in China are
the most expensive in the world and that many Chinese consumers
traveled abroad to purchase milk powder. 133 It further suggests that
the NDRC’s investigation is intended to quell this abnormal trend.134
The day after the CCTV’s announcement, People’s Daily disclosed
the names of five more companies who were also involved, claiming
that it had obtained confirmation from the NDRC. 135 This disclosure
suggests that the NDRC leaked the information to People’s Daily and
subjected the other five firms to a different level of publicity than
Biostime.
The leakage to the CCTV and People’s Daily caused a stir in
China. In WiseNews, I identified a total of eighty-three news articles
covering this case on July 2, 2013 (the day after the CCTV’s
announcement) and July 3, 2013 (the day after People’s Daily’s
announcement). Forty-seven percent of these news reports discussed
the phenomenon of excessive pricing in the high-end infant formula
and all of these reports carry a negative tone against the businesses.
For example, on July 2, 2013, China Business News, one of the most
popular financial newspapers in China, published a detailed report
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Feng Ya, Fagawei Jiage Jiandu Jiancha Yu Fanlongduan Ju Dui Heshengyuan
Jinxing Fanlongduan Diaocha [NDRC Launched Antitrust Investigation Into Biostime],
FINANCE.CNR.CN(July 1, 2013), http://finance.cnr.cn/gundong/201307/t20130701_5129397
29.shtml [https://perma.cc/9DZ6-NQD2] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Zhu Jianhong, Fagaiwei Fanlongduan Ju Zhengzai Diaocha Duojia Naifen Qiye
Shexian Jiage Longdong [NDRC Is Launching An Antitrust Investigation Into Milk Powder
Companies Suspected of Price Monopolies], PEOPLE’S DAILY, (July 2, 2013),
http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0703/c1004-22056243.html [https://perma.cc/5MAK-28
38] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) (noting that MeadJohnson, Abbott, Danone, Dumex,
FrieslandCampina and Wyeth were also investigated).

2018]

THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN ANTITRUST

499

about how Biostime maintained an elaborate and strict price control
system in the supply chain network to maintain its high prices. 136 On
July 3, 2013, China Business News published another story with a
dramatized title “Cost RMB 100 but Sold at RMB 800, Some Infant
Formula Producers Are to Be Subject to High Fines.” 137 The article
noted that ever since the milk scandal that took place in China in
2008, Chinese consumers had lost confidence in domestically
produced infant formula products. 138 As Chinese consumers switched
to foreign infant formula products, the foreign producers started to
exploitatively increase the prices, causing Chinese consumers to pay
three or even four times the prices than foreign consumers. 139 The
report quoted Wang Dingmian, a diary expert who noted that some
infant formula producers such as Nestle charged RMB 400 per can,
and Biostime charged RMB 500 and sometimes even RMB 800.140
Wang called on the NDRC to impose hefty fines on these infant
formula producers. 141 He claimed that many of the foreign producers
reaped billions of yuan from the Chinese market in the past few years,
and thus the fine must exceed RMB one billion for it to effectively
deter such conduct. 142
Meanwhile, the CCTV, People’s Daily, and Xinhua News, the
three most powerful media outlets directly controlled by the central
government, all expressed strong support for the NDRC’s action
while condemning the misconduct of these infant formula
manufacturers. On July 3, 2013, the CCTV produced a TV program
that provided extensive coverage of the case.143 The TV show started
by highlighting the phenomenon of abnormal price increases of
136 . Zhang Zhiwei, Heshengyuan Bei Fagaiwei Diaocha, Gaojia Yankong Moushi
Shoukao [Biostime Was Investigated for Antitrust Violations, High Resale Price Maintenance
Was Subject to Challenge] (July 2, 2013), http://www.yicai.com/news/2825221.html
[https://perma.cc/AHW6-YM7W] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
137 . He Tianjiao & Sun Xu, Chenben Yibai Yuan Maidao Babai Yuan She Jiage
Caozhong Naiqi Huo Zao Jue Fakuan [Cost RMB100 but Sold at RMB800, Some Infant
Formula Producers Are to Be Subject to High Fines] (July 3, 2013), http://
www.yicai.com/news/2828433.html [https://perma.cc/V6G4-FVBC] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. CCTV, Fanlongduan Liqi: Yao Gaoju Bie Qingfang [Attention To Anti-Monopoly
and Do Not Easily Let Go], CNTV.CN (July 3, 2013), http://tv.cntv.cn/video/VSET10015626
9129/bf4ecb08d1fa47829daa6bc5d74760dd [https://perma.cc/UJD5-A7YA] (last visited Jan.
4, 2018).
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foreign milk powder since 2008. 144 It then interviewed three experts,
one of whom was a CCTV commentator, while the other two were
leading experts on Chinese antitrust law. 145 Both law professors only
provided conclusive comments, noting that these firms tried to fix the
resale prices of distributors and that this harmed consumers. 146
Neither of them hinted that RPM could potentially be exempted under
the AML, nor did they discuss whether these manufacturers could
qualify for these exemptions. 147 The CCTV commentator concluded
that consumers placed unusually high trust in foreign milk powders
due to quality concerns over domestic products, so they had no choice
but to choose foreign products despite their excessive prices. 148
On the same day, People’s Daily published an editorial
applauding the NDRC’s investigation without discussing any details
of the case. 149 The next day, an editorial entitled “Milk Powder
Manufacturers Faced Antitrust Investigation, Ending the Feasts of
their Oligopolies in China” appeared at The Economic Information
Daily, a business-oriented newspaper owned by the Xinhua News.150
The article provides no analysis of the actual case, but simply
condemns the excessively high prices of foreign milk powder
manufactures. The bias against these businesses is revealed in the
following conclusion reached in the article: “Although the final
results of the investigation have not been released, it could be almost
certain that the manufacturers involved have intentionally reduced
intra-brand and inter-brand competition, in order to reinforce its
monopoly position in China, to ensure the lowest input and to reap
abnormal profits.” 151
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149 . Jia Zhuang, Renmin Ribao Renmin Shiping: Pochan “Yanglongduan” Youdai
Guochan Hao Naifen [Opinions: Nine Domestic Milk Powder May Defeat the Monopolies of
Foreign Milk Powder Companies], PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 3, 2013), http://opini
on.people.com.cn/n/2013/0703/c1003-22054806.html
[https://perma.cc/ZR5N-VNXF]
(archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
150. Jingji Cankao Bao, Yang Naifen Mianlin Fanlongduan Diaocha Zhongjie Naifen
Guatou De Zhongguo Shengyan [Milk Powder Manufacturers Faced Antitrust Investigation,
Ending the Feasts of their Oligopolies in China], XINHUA (July 4, 2013),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/jcgc/20130704/152416017348.shtml [https://perma.cc/4UV
N-UHXX] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
151. Id. The Economic Information Daily also published another news report describing
the reactions of the Chinese public to the NDRC’s investigations. Jingji Cankao Bao,
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By strategically leaking information to the state media, the
NDRC helped the news channel gain the first mover advantage in
reporting the case. Then the CCTV’s negative coverage of Biostimes
set the tone for subsequent news outlets. The endorsement from the
other two main politically-controlled newspapers further reinforced
the bias. Notably, none of the infant formula producers launched a
countervailing media campaign to defend themselves. The lack of
response might have been due to the pressures that they faced from
the NDRC, who had reiterated that firms that proactively cooperated
with the agency would be rewarded with reduced fines—implying
that those that defended themselves would be subject to higher
sanctions. 152 Unlike China Telecom and China Unicom, foreign infant
formula producers may have lacked the political clout to influence
any newspapers. These producers may also believe that any defense
will be futile given the public’s resentment towards high prices.
Indeed, as illustrated in the China Telecom/China Unicom case, even
if the SOEs had been able to launch a fierce combat in other statecontrolled media, this would not have changed the public opinion
over the NDRC’s investigation. To avoid prompting retaliation from
the regulator and potentially provoking more anger from Chinese
consumers, a safer approach would have been to admit guilt quickly
and reduce prices to appease consumers.
V. THE RARITY OF DISSENTS IN CHINA
In addition to winning a public endorsement, another important
factor that contributed to the NDRC’s successful media campaign is
the support that it received from Chinese antitrust experts. Antitrust is
one of the fastest developing areas of practice in China. The severe
Yangnaifen Fanlongduan Diaocha Youzhu Hangye Huigui Lixing [Antitrust Investigation Into
Foreign Milk Powder Companies Would Help The Industry Regain Its Rationality],
NEWS.XINHUANET.COM (July 4, 2013), http://dz.jjckb.cn/www/pages/webpage2009/html/
2013-07/04/content_76687.htm?div=-1 [https://perma.cc/272T-WPXP] (last visited Jan. 17,
2018) (quoting the comments from the Chinese netizens, the report notes that the misconduct
of these foreign milk powder manufacturers should have been investigated a long time ago,
and that this investigation provides an opportunity for domestic manufacturers to compete with
foreign brands so domestic producers should treasure this opportunity).
152. Michael Martina, Tough Talking China-Pricing Regulator Sought Concession from
Foreign Firms, REUTERS (August 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-antitrustidUSBRE97K05020130822 [https://perma.cc/Q7ML-AN7Q] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018); Tom
Mitchell, China Antitrust Ruling Blunts Foreign Criticisms, FINANCIAL TIMES (August 21,
2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/61d3f8aa-28ff-11e4-9d5d-00144feabdc0.html#slide0 [https:
//perma.cc/29FD-K6CH] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
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sanctions that could be imposed under the AML incentivizes
businesses to spend resources to defend their cases. However, the lack
of procedural safeguards and judicial oversight of agency actions
makes the antitrust bar less effective in constraining the actions of the
administrative authorities. Because firms very often would rather
choose to acquiesce rather than directly challenge the agency’s
actions in court, there is little market demand to challenge agency
decisions in court. Private law firms, therefore, could not gain much
by taking an aggressive, adversarial approach in defending their
clients. Indeed, they would risk burning their bridge with the
government if they take an antagonistic approach in dealing with the
government.
Moreover, for lawyers working in the antitrust field, it is vital to
develop a good relationship with the Chinese regulators. Due to the
opacity of the regulatory process and the great discretion that antitrust
agencies possess, lawyers who have established good personal
relationships with the case handlers will enjoy a competitive
advantage in obtaining valuable information regarding the status of
the reviews and investigations, as well as understanding the individual
preferences of the officials involved. The more information that the
lawyers can obtain from the regulators, the more informed and wellplayed that their reactions to the regulators’ offers can be. Chinese
antitrust lawyers thus play the critical role of what sociologist Ronald
Burt called the information brokers. 153 Their positions in the social
network become important forms of social capital that are assets in
their own right.
Furthermore, Chinese antitrust lawyers and law firms are repeat
players who have the opportunity to establish their reputations in
antitrust practice. 154 Because interaction with the government is a
routine part of their daily business, this incentivizes lawyers to
achieve a reputation for cooperation. Cooperative lawyers can
cultivate a better relationship with the agencies, which will also
enhance their credibility in front of the regulator. For instance, in
cartel investigations, the NDRC often requests that the suspected
firms self-investigate and self-report any cartel conduct. 155 If the firm
153 . RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE & CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
CAPITAL 4 (2005).
154. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 513 (1994).
155. Interview with a Chinese antitrust lawyer, in London, Eng. (April 12, 2016).
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proposes that it will engage a “cooperative” law firm to do this, it
signals the credibility 156 of the self-report prepared by its lawyers. 157
This advantage, in turn, helps the lawyer attract more clients. The
more representations that lawyers accumulate, the more experienced
that they become, and therefore the more popular they become.
As Gilson and Mnookin point out, law firms “provide a larger
repository of reputational capital,” and, therefore, defection by any
single lawyer in a single case will jeopardize the entire firm’s
reputation with the government agency. 158 Indeed, the larger and
more established that the firm’s antitrust practice is, the more
reputational capital that it will have at stake, and thus the more
reluctant that it will be to forfeit such a reputation by representing a
client that wants to challenge the agency’s decision. 159 In the worst
situation, a non-cooperative Chinese lawyer may even face a boycott
from the regulator. 160 This action is fatal to lawyers, as being unable
to represent the client in front of the regulator will render the lawyer
worthless to the client. Moreover, because each of the three antitrust
agencies is housed within large central ministries that have various
policy controls, the law firms would anticipate repeated dealings with
these agencies on various fronts. Therefore, few law firms with an
established antitrust practice would dare to jeopardize their
relationship with the central antitrust authority by bringing a suit
against it.
Chinese academics face the same dilemma as lawyers. While
Chinese enforcers have been subject to fierce criticisms in foreign
media, surprisingly these agencies face little opposition in China.
Criticisms of government are a highly delicate issue, and academic
freedom is limited in China. 161 Moreover, as businesses cannot bring

156. Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51
REV. ECON. STUD. 293 (1984).
157. Id.
158. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 154, at 530.
159. Id. at 525; see also Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces
in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
160. Michael Martina & Matthew Miller, ‘Mr. Confession’ and His Boss Drive China’s
Antitrust Crusade, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-antitrustndrc-insight-idUSKBN0HA27X20140915 (recalling a ‘two warning system’ where lawyers
running afoul of vague protocol or who are persistent in defense of their clients are threatened
with being banned from meetings with the regulator, a way of suppressing client advocacy).
161. Gary King et al., How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but
Silences Collective Expression, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 326 (2013); see also Hearing on “Is
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the agencies to court, there is little market demand for academic
criticisms of agency decisions in China. Indeed, Chinese antitrust
scholars are not only assessed by their scholarly works but more
importantly, by their connection with and proximity to the antitrust
regulators. Similar to Chinese lawyers, an important asset of a
Chinese legal academic is the collection of privileged sources of
information to which he or she has access. Scholars who are favored
by the regulators are invited to advise on large and important antitrust
cases, which gives them valuable insights into the regulatory practice.
The leading scholars are invited to sit on the Expert Advisory
Committee of the Anti-Monopoly Commission (“AMC”), a
prestigious position that also provides them with insights into the
inner workings of the antitrust regulators. Thus, the last thing that
antitrust experts want is to develop a reputation for criticizing the
regulators, or they will find it difficult to maintain their connections
with the regulators and may face retaliation in the future, as
demonstrated by the Zhang Xinzhu incident below.
A. Public Criticisms of RPM Decisions
RPM investigations have constituted one of the NDRC’s most
important enforcement priorities in recent years. From 2008 to 2015,
the NDRC brought four large RPM cases in industries involving
white liquor, infant formula, eye glasses, and auto parts. However,
RPM cases are also very controversial from a legal standpoint, and
economists have identified many procompetitive reasons why firms
would choose to conduct such practices. 162 Even if a firm has been
found to have committed RPM practice, it is far from clear that such
conduct is anticompetitive or would harm the interests of consumers.
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the century-old
precedent in the Dr. Miles resale price maintenance agreement case
and endorsed a more lenient rule of reason approach in investigating
RPM. 163 Despite such controversy over RPM practices, criticisms of
the NDRC’s investigations into RPM cases were scant.
In the WiseNews database, I found no criticisms of the agency’s
investigation in the White Liquor Case. I was able to identify four
Academic Freedom Threatened by China’s Influence on American Universities”, H. Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 113 Cong. 13- 22 (2014) (statement of Perry Link).
162. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 306-47 (2004).
163. See generally PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods, 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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editorials that expressed skepticism about the NDRC’s legal position
in the Infant Formula Case, but they represent a mere one percent of
all the news reports that I found on WiseNews.
The first editorial, published in the Beijing News on July 3,
2013, was contributed by a columnist who analyzed the legal merits
of the NDRC’s investigation. 164 The article discussed the recent
precedents involving resale price maintenance and highlighted the
decision delivered by the Shanghai Intermediate Court involving
Johnson & Johnson’s resale price maintenance practice. 165 In that
case, the Shanghai court applied a rule of reason analysis similar to
the one applied by the United States Supreme Court in Leegin. 166
After finding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden of proof, the
court dismissed its action. 167 The author suggested that the NDRC’s
analysis of the Infant Formula Case should adopt a similar rule of
reason analysis and take into account those competition factors
applied in the Johnson & Johnson case. 168 Only two days later, the
same columnist contributed another editorial in Beijing News. 169 He
alleged that the NDRC was adopting a per se illegal approach in
analyzing resale price maintenance cases. 170 He noted that the NDRC
had taken a highly controversial position which was blatantly
inconsistent with the Shanghai court’s judgment in Johnson &
Johnson case. 171 He further explained that dairy companies chose not
to defend themselves because the NDRC possessed significant
discretion under the AML in determining legal sanctions, and that
these companies therefore offered significant price reductions in order
to appease the regulator in the hope of a lower fine. 172 Finally, the
author noted that in the absence of clear guidelines from the Supreme
164. Shen Bing, Naifen XianXianjia Xiaoshou Ruhe Panding Zhongxiang Longduan
[Milk Powder Resale Price Maintenance How to Determine Vertical Antitrust Violation] (July
3, 2013), http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-07/03/content_444790.htm?div=-1 [https://
perma.cc/XLD4-XEHA] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Shen Bing, Zao Fanlongduan Diaocha, Naiqi Yinghe Furuan Jiangjia [Why Dairy
Companies Subject to Investigation Relented and Reduced Prices] (July 5, 2013),
http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-07/05/content_445280.htm?div=-1 [https://perma.cc/X
E5P-J5W4] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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People’s Court on how to interpret the relevant provision under the
AML, no company would dare to challenge the NDRC’s cases in
court. 173
The second editorial, published by Beijing Times, was
contributed by Mei Xinyu, a researcher from the MOFCOM on July
10, 2013. 174 Mei used a skeptical tone and suggested that the NDRC’s
legal basis is probably wrong. 175 Mei first argued that the NDRC’s
case rested on dubious grounds—vertical agreements should not be
illegal per se, and there are many procompetitive justifications for
such actions. 176 Moreover, the cause for the high prices of infant
formula powder in China lies not in an antitrust problem, but rather in
the low rate of breastfeeding, the irrational quest for foreign milk
powder, and the excessive layers of sales channels.177 Criticism from
MOFCOM is not surprising. Even though both MOFCOM and the
NDRC are central ministries, they have different bureaucratic
interests—the former endorses the open market and reform, whereas
the latter favors industrial policy and direct intervention in the
market. 178
The third editorial, published in the Economic Observer on July
25, 2017, was contributed by a journalist. 179 The author argued that an
RPM conduct by a firm that lacks significant market power is
unlikely to cause any anticompetitive harm. 180 She noted that Chinese
infant formula market was highly fragmented, with the largest
producer, MeadJohnson, holding a mere 12.3% of the shares in the
market. 181 Moreover, the public’s call for price reduction through
regulatory intervention could not resolve the long-term issue of the
173. Id.
174. See Mei Xinyu, Mei Xinyu: Lengyan Kan Yangnaifen Fanlongduan Yangnaifen
Gaojia Rengnan Genchu [Mei Xinyu: Keep An Reasonable View On Anti-Monopoly Against
Foreign Milk Powder Companies; The Root For Their High Price Would Not Be Eliminated
Because Of Anti-Monopoly Invesigations], CS.COM.CN (July 10, 2013), http://www.cs.com.cn/
xwzx/ms/201307/t20130710_4058832.html [https://perma.cc/XQ9Z-V7EA] (last visited Jan.
4, 2018).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Zhang, supra note 8, at 693.
179. Xue Ying, Lahui Zoushen De Dazhong [Pulling Back the Absented Minded Public],
JINGJI GUANCHA WANG [ECONOMIC OBSERVER] (July 25, 2013), http://www.eeo.com.cn/
2013/0725/247199.shtml [https://perma.cc/U9GL-XEC5] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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mistrust that Chinese consumers placed in domestic infant formula.182
The editorial also warned of the unintended consequences that might
follow as a result of the NDRC’s pressures on these producers to
reduce prices. 183 In the end, the author called for more
professionalism in the enforcement of the AML. 184
The fourth editorial, published in Beijing News on August 1,
2013, was contributed by You Yunting, a lawyer based in
Shanghai. 185 In this editorial, You expressed skepticism that the
NDRC’s actions could rein in high prices for infant formula in
China.186 He noted that the NDRC possessed significant discretion in
setting the fines. Thus, the infant formula producers offered price
reductions for fear of higher sanctions. 187 However, such price
reductions are only temporary, and it is unrealistic to hope that an
antitrust investigation can rein in prices, as the ultimate pricing power
still lies with the producers. 188 Moreover, You believed that the cause
of high prices of infant formula in China had less to do with resale
price maintenance, but rather with the mistrust that Chinese
consumers placed on domestic infant formula products. 189 Besides,
there is an academic controversy regarding the anti-competitiveness
of the resale price maintenance practices itself. 190 As a legal
specialist, You’s critical comments on the NDRC’s investigation
would strike many as bold. However, he is not a specialist in antitrust
law, though his practice encompasses a wide range of corporate and
litigation matters. Thus, he had much less to lose, even if his
comments did upset those working inside the NDRC.
The above-mentioned articles were published in commercialized
media outlets, but none of them generated much fanfare in the press,
nor were they reproduced in any other news outlets. Moreover, none
of the articles were contributed by a well-established antitrust
academic or lawyer. Even though several leading Chinese antitrust
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. You Yunting, Fanglonduanfa Nanjie Yinger Naifen Gaojia Wenti [The AntiMonopoly Law Cannot Solve the Problem of the High Prices of Infant Formula] (August 1,
2014),http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-08/01/content_454281.htm?div=-1 [https://perm
a.cc/L5WD-M57U] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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experts were interviewed and commented on the case, none of them
voiced any doubts about the NDRC’s investigation.
Similarly, I found only one critical editorial on the Auto Part
Case in WiseNews and the author, Liu Zichuan was a columnist. 191 In
this editorial entitled “Antitrust: The Government Should Played the
Role As A Nightwatchman,” Liu advocated for four things: first, a
pattern of high prices in itself should not constitute an antitrust
violation; second, resale price maintenance conduct has many procompetitive justifications and is unlikely to trigger antitrust concerns
in a competitive market; third, the power of the regulator should also
be checked; and fourth, the priority for Chinese antitrust enforcement
should be administrative abuse, rather than market abuse, as the
market also has a self-correcting function. 192 Despite being a
generalist, Liu seems to possess a clear understanding of the relevant
literature in Chinese antitrust. It is not entirely clear whether there
were ghostwriters behind him that contributed to the editorial, but it
expressed the legitimate concern about the NDRC’s enforcement in
resale price maintenance cases. Unfortunately, similar to those in the
Infant Formula Case, the editorial attracted little attention and
generated no response from any other media outlets. The critical
voices were too dim to be heard.
B. The Controversy in A Telecom Case
In contrast to the scant criticisms in RPM cases, criticisms
abounded in the China Telecom and China Unicom Case. In my
WiseNews sample, over twelve percent of the news articles (25 out of
202) quoted experts who criticized the NDRC’s investigation,
compared with thirty seven percent (76 out of 202) who quoted
experts who expressed endorsement. Almost all those experts who
provided critical comments are experts in the telecom industry; no
antitrust scholar cast any doubt, with the only exception of Zhang
Xinzhu. 193 Zhang is a preeminent Chinese scholar from the Academy

191. Liu Zichuan, Fanlongduan: Zhengfu Geying Banyan Shouyeren [Antitrust: The
Government Should Played the Role As A Nightwatchman] (August 11, 2014), http://
www.eeo.com.cn/2014/0811/264813.shtml [https://perma.cc/ES96-JQFA] (last visited Jan. 4,
2018).
192. Id.
193. Dong Dong et al., Zhang Xinzhu: Chong Muqian De Xinxi Kan Lilun Shang Wufa
Rending Longduan [Not Sufficient to Conclude Antitrust Violation Based on Existing
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of Social Science, and received his doctoral degree from the Toulouse
School of Economics, under the supervision of Jean-Jacques
Laffont. 194 Unlike most antitrust scholars, Zhang is an expert in both
telecommunication regulation and antitrust regulation. Long before he
advised on antitrust matters, he had served as an advisor for Chinese
telecom firms and the telecom regulator MIIT. 195 Zhang also served
on the Expert Advisory Committee to the AMC. 196 The Committee
comprises of twenty one experts in law, economics, and various
industry sectors. 197
Two days after the NDRC’s announcement of its investigation
into China Telecom and China Unicom, the Oriental Morning Post
interviewed Zhang, who provided very critical comments on the
NDRC’s antitrust investigation. 198 Zhang asserted that the internet
retail access market has already been liberalized, so the competition
was very fierce, and the differential pricing reflected a market
outcome. 199 He pointed out that there was insufficient evidence to
conclude that these two SOEs had committed antitrust violations.200
He criticized the NDRC for inappropriately assuming the role of a
telecom regulator, as the matter should have been handled jointly by
both the antitrust and the telecom regulators. 201 He suggested that a
wiser solution for the NDRC would be to promote institutional
restructuring. 202 Zhang also expressed worry over the absence of the
participation of economists during the enforcement of the AML in the
Evidence] (Nov. 11, 2011), http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/jcgc/20111111/070510796575.
shtml [https://perma.cc/WPN6-LQVC] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
194. Yingyi Qian, Lafeng Dui Jingjixue He Jingjixue Jiaoyu De Gongxian [Laffont’s
Contribution to the Economics Dicipline and the Economic Education], CAIXIN WANG
[CAIXIN NET] (Oct. 14, 2016), http://opinion.caixin.com/2016-10-14/100997008.html [https://
perma.cc/P5YN-7EN2] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
195. Shengyi & Tan Jieyu, Zhang Xinzhu Qiren: Cen Canyu Qicao Fanlongduan Fa
Pipin Dianxin Fanlongduan An [Zhang Xinzhu Who Drafted the AML Criticized the Telecom
Antitrust Case], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S NET] (August 14, 2014), http://
finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140814/174220014032.shtml
[https://perma.cc/G27Y-Q7TQ]
(last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
196. Id.
197. Guo Liqin, Shenxian Gaotong Xuanwo De Zhang Xinzhu [Zhang Xinzhu Who Is in
Deep Trouble], DIYI CAIJIN RIBAO [CHINA BUSINESS NEWS] (Oct. 13, 2014), http://
www.yicai.com/news/4027003.html [https://perma.cc/9MA3-QYWW] (archived on Jan. 4,
2018).
198. Dong Dong et al., supra note 193.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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past three years, arguing that economists should have played a
prominent role in enforcing antitrust law. 203 He criticized the NDRC’s
overzealous attempt to regulate while ignoring the proper rules or
standards in antitrust enforcement. 204 Lastly, Zhang condemned the
agency’s tactic of using public opinion against these telecom SOEs
and failing to make full disclosure of the case. 205
After the two SOEs requested the suspension of the NDRC’s
investigation, Zhang contributed another editorial to the Oriental
Morning Post. 206 Zhang first observed that the NDRC’s proactive
disclosure of the case on the CCTV was a skillful move to leverage
the public’s resentment against those state monopolies, and the
NDRC successfully achieved its objective in mobilizing public
sentiment. 207 However, as he pointed out, such a strategic move is
problematic from the perspective of antitrust law enforcement. 208
Zhang argued that antitrust enforcement should not be interfered with
by public opinion, but rather be grounded in law and facts. 209 Zhang
acknowledged that room for improvement remains in the regulation
of the telecom industry. However, he also condemned the NDRC’s
practice, stating that no other antitrust enforcement agency in the
world would use the media to influence the antitrust enforcement
outcome. 210 Zhang argued that antitrust enforcers should rationally
consider requests from rivals, as the spirit of the antitrust law is to
protect competition, rather than competitors. 211 He noted that while
the interest groups involved in this case remain a mystery, rival stateowned telecom firms seemed to have played a role in pushing the
NDRC into investigating these two SOEs. 212 He warned antitrust
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Xinzhu Zhang, Dianxin Fanlongduan An Fansi: Changquan Gaige Shi Nan Yi
Yuyue Hong Gou [Reflections on China Telecom Antitrust Case: The Reform of Property
Rights is the Impossible Chasm], XINLANG CAIJING [SINA FIN.] (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20111213/073810981972.shtml
[https://perma.cc/
H7WQ-LENM] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) (arguing that the NDRC’s allegation that the two
telecom firms conducted price discrimination without reasonable justification lacks legal and
economic support).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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regulators that they should be vigilant about the strategic use of the
antitrust law to harm rivals. 213
Zhang then moved on to analyze the legal merits of this case. He
first clarified that the AML only prohibits abuse of dominant position,
and the possession of a monopoly position is not illegal per se.214 He
then noted that it was not even clear whether these two telecom SOEs
held a dominant position in the relevant market in the first place.215
Even if they did, as Zhang argued, the regulators would still need to
satisfy a high burden of proof in proving the abusive conduct of these
two firms. 216 Zhang advocated a rule of reason approach in analyzing
the alleged price discrimination by these two SOEs. 217 Moreover, he
outlined a number of reasons for defending the pricing practices of
these two telecom firms, arguing that the existing evidence gathered
by the NDRC was insufficient to prove the alleged abusive conduct of
these two SOEs. 218 Last but not least, he proposed that the
fundamental solution for reforming Chinese telecom industry lies in
property reform. 219 He argued that without such market reforms, there
would not be effective competition in the telecom industry, and he
warned against the scenario in which an antitrust regulator would
become a de facto price regulator of the telecom industry. 220 He also
criticized the remedies requested by the NDRC in regulating the
interconnection prices charged by these two SOEs, stating that it
would be an undesirable form of price regulation that would lack a
basis under the AML. 221
Among the experts who have served on the Expert Advisory
Committee to AMC, Zhang is the only antitrust expert who dared to
challenge the NDRC’s position publicly thus far. However, his
outspoken comments also spell impending trouble for himself.
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C. The Dismissal of An Antitrust Expert
On August 12, 2014, news broke that Zhang Xinzhu had been
sacked from the Expert Advisory Committee to the AMC after
allegedly accepting a large sum for defending Qualcomm. 222 The
news caused a stir in the Chinese media. It also surprised Zhang, who
told news reporter that he was not aware of this until he learned it
from the newspaper. 223 Zhang claimed that he had been dismissed
from the Committee for “speaking for foreign businesses.” 224 He
recalled that the chair of the Committee, Zhang Qiong, had asked him
to conduct a self-assessment of his consulting practice for Qualcomm
a few months earlier. 225 Zhang Qiong reprimanded Zhang Xinzhu for
speaking for foreign firms and opposing the government’s position.226
Zhang analogized his situation as a criminal defense lawyer: “It’s like
I am defending a criminal facing death sentence. Every case should
have two sides, they couldn’t deprive my rights to speak.” 227 Zhang
claimed that the trigger for this case was not Qualcomm. 228 As a vocal
critic of the NDRC in the China Telecom and China Unicom Case,
Zhang explained that his comments created many obstacles for the
agency. 229 As he confessed with the newspaper: “Currently, China’s
administrative law enforcement is extremely dangerous, with
222. Neil Gough & Chris Buckley, Adviser to Government in Chinese Investigation of
Qualcomm Is Ousted, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/
business/international/antitrust-adviser-to-beijing-ousted-in-inquiry-over-payments.html.
223. Shi Dongdong, Zhang Xinzhu Huiying Bei Guowuyuan Fanlongduan Weiyuanhui
Zhuanjia Zu Jieping: Wo Bang Waiqi Shuohua Le [Zhang Xinzhu Responded to the Dismissal
by the Expert Advisory Committee to the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council: I
spoke for Foreign Firms], PENGPAI [THE PAPER] (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.thepaper.cn/
newsDetail_forward_1261301 [https://perma.cc/EK58-PUXK] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
224. Id.
225. Li Wei, Fanlongduan Fanduizhe: Xiagan Zhuanjia Zhang Xinzhu [Antitrust
Opponent: The Jobless Expert Zhang Xinzhu], CAIJING YAN [CAIJING EYE] (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://finance.qq.com/zt2014/focus/fld.html [https://perma.cc/JU3W-9KYX] (last visited Jan.
4, 2018).
226. Id.
227. Han Zhe, Fanlongduan Yaorang Zhengfan Fang Dou Shuohua [Both Voices Should
Be Heard In The Anti-Monopoly Investigations], CHINADAILY.COM.CN (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/xfly/2014-08-14/content_12193072.html [https://perma.cc/
737A-PSPZ] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
228. Shi Dongdong, Zhang Xinzhu Huiying Bei Jieping: Wobang Waiqi Shuohua Le
Haimei Shoudao Tongzhi [Zhang Xinzhu Responded to Dismissal: I Spoke for Foreign Firms
and Haven’t Received Notice], ZI MAO QU YOUBAO [FTZ POST] (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140812/220919989721.shtml [https://perma.cc/MHX4-E5P
N] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
229. Id.
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investigative powers and law enforcement powers bound together.” 230
Zhang was pessimistic about the future of China’s antitrust
enforcement, as he lamented: “From the viewpoint of administrative
enforcement of the law, China’s anti-monopoly law is at a dead end.
The judiciary is the only hope.” 231
On August 13, 2014, there was widespread speculation on
Chinese media that Zhang Xinzhu had accepted six million in
compensation for speaking for Qualcomm, although it was not clear
whether the figure was in US dollars or RMB. 232 For instance, the 21st
Century Business Herald, a popular business newspaper in China,
published an article entitled “Zhang Xinzhu Responded to the
Allegation of Accepting 6 Million Bribery from Qualcomm:
Bullshit.” 233 The use of “bribery” suggested that Zhang’s consulting
for Qualcomm was illegal. Zhang strongly denied this allegation, but
the figure was widely quoted by major newspapers. On WiseNews, I
found that almost all of the news articles published the next day
mentioned Zhang’s compensation of six million. On August 13, 2014,
Xinhua News published an editorial entitled “Those Experts Who
Fished in Troubled Water, Living on Our Country While Leaking
Secrets to Others Are Not Tolerated.” 234 The editorial carried a very
harsh tone, condemning the fact that Zhang used his title as a member
of the Expert Advisory Committee to back foreign firms. 235 The
editorial also suggests that even though Zhang is a very
knowledgeable expert, his behavior should be condemned as
unethical. 236 It noted that some multi-national companies tried to use
all sorts of tactics to defend themselves and delay the investigations
into them. 237 Moreover, those government experts who worked for
foreign firms violated the disciplinary rules and such conduct should
be penalized. 238 As Xinhua is regarded as a Party mouthpiece, this
230. Id.
231. Gough & Buckley, supra note 222.
232. Zhang Xinzhu Huiying Shouhui Gaotong 600 Wan: Chedan [Zhang Xinzhu
Responded to The Allegation of Accepting 600 Million Bribery from Qualcomm: Bullshit], 21
SHIJI JINGJI BAO [21ST CENTURY BUESINSS HERALD] (August 13, 2014), http://finance.sina.
com.cn/china/20140813/214720002508.shtml [https://perma.cc/M3W9-LP83] (archived on
Jan. 4, 2018).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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editorial signaled that the Chinse leadership had set the tone for the
incident. The editorial was highly influential. In the WiseNews
database, I found ten news articles published on the same date that
directly copied the editorial from Xinhua.
On the same day, the CCTV produced another TV program
reporting the case.239 The discussion revolved around the conflict of
interest issue in this case and interviewed Ren Yuling, a consultant for
the State Council.240 Mr. Ren was concerned about the Zhang Xinzhu
incident, noting that it was not purely a commercial matter and that it
might have also affected the national interest. 241 As Zhang might leak
information to foreign firms, Ren hinted that there could be
corruption. 242 Mr. Ren then called for more laws to be promulgated to
address such problems. 243 Meanwhile, several newspapers hinted that
Zhang could be subject to legal sanctions. On August 14, 2014,
Global Times released an editorial, noting that it was not clear
whether Zhang Xinzhu possessed state secrets when serving on the
Expert Advisory Committee and thus his consulting service to
Qualcomm may amount to the selling of state secrets. 244 Yangtze
News also speculated that Zhang might have had the capacity to
obtain state secrets. 245 The article pointed to Article 111 of the
Criminal Law, which states that the sale of state secrets could be
subject to a jail sentence of up to imprisonment for life. 246
On August 14, 2014, Qualcomm representatives denied direct
compensation for Zhang Xinzhu, clarifying that Qualcomm instead
hired Global Economics, an economic consultancy where Zhang

239. CCTV, Guowuyuan Zhuanjia Bei Jieping: Huoying Shou Gaotong Haochu Fei
[State Council Expert Was Dismissed: Maybe Due to the Benefits Received from Qualcomm],
Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News Net] (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/
2014/08-13/6488450.shtml [https://perma.cc/XPY4-FVTK] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Shan Renping, Guowuyuan Fanlongduan Zhuanjia Anzhu Waiqi Taibugai [State
Council Antitrust Expert Shouldn’t Have Secretly Assisted Foreign Firms], HUANGQIU
SHIBAO [GLOBAL TIMES], (Aug. 14, 2014), http://opinion.huanqiu.com/shanrenping/201408/5105235.html [https://perma.cc/VQ45-AMBS] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
245. Yang Yuze, Zhang Xinzhu Shijian de Lunli He Falv [The Ethics and Law in The
Zhang Xinzhu Incident’s] (August 15, 2014), http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0815/c100
3-25471636.html [https://perma.cc/YUW5-CSDD] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
246. Id.
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served as an expert.247 Qualcomm also noted that the engagement of
economic experts was standard practice during antitrust
investigations. 248 Zhang refused to provide further comments during
an interview with a newspaper, alleging that the current media
environment was very hostile. 249 On September 11, 2014, Xu Kunlin,
the former director general of the antitrust unit at the NDRC made a
detailed explanation of the dismissal of Zhang Xinzhu during a press
conference. 250 Xu explained the dismissal had to do with a research
report that Qualcomm submitted to the NDRC, in which Zhang was
one of the three contributors. 251 The NDRC claimed that Zhang
Xinzhu was supposed to receive USD 1.4 million from Qualcomm for
his advisory service, and until the time that he was sacked, he had
received USD 77,000. 252
In WiseNews, I identified sixty news articles discussing the
dismissal of Zhang Xinzhu from the date of the first public disclosure
of his dismissal to the day before the NDRC released its decision in
Qualcomm. Among these articles, ninety-three percent noted that
Zhang Xinzhu had accepted high compensation from Qualcomm for
defending the firm and forty-six percent mentioned that he accepted
six million from Qualcomm; some articles reported that that figure
was in dollars, but others were ambiguous. Forty-seven percent
expressly condemned and criticized Zhang’s conduct. Public opinion
was also hostile toward Zhang Xinzhu. A poll on Sina shows that
eighty percent of those surveyed believed that Zhang Xinzhu had
some illicit dealings with Qualcomm. 253 Only two editorials that I
identified in WiseNews defended Zhang Xinzhu. The first article was
247 . Jimmo Zang, Gaotong Fouren Yu Zhang Xinzhu You Zhijie Caiwu Lianxi
[Qualcomm Denied Direct Financial Dealings with Zhang Xinzhu], TENGXUN KEJI [TENANT
TECHNOLOGY] (Aug. 14, 2014), http://tech.qq.com/a/20140814/080401.htm [https://perma.cc/
BWU2-L42P] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
248. Id.
249. Gough & Buckley, supra note 222.
250. Li Xiaoyu, Guowuyuan Fanlongduan Weiyuanhui Jieping Zhuanjia Zhang Xinzhu
Ye Shouping Gaotong Gongsi [The Expert Advisory Committee of the Antimonopoly Bureau
Dismissed Zhang Xinzhu Who Was Also Employed by Qualcomm], ZHONGGUO XINWEN
WANG [CHINA NEWS NET] (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/09-11/658
3116.shtml [https://perma.cc/S692-QD53] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Xinlang Caijing [Sina Finance], Ni Ruhe Kandai Fanlongduan Zhuanjia Bei Jieping
[How Do You View the Dismissal of Antitrust Experts?], XINLANG DIAOCHA [SINA
INVESTIGATION] (Aug. 15, 2014), http://survey.finance.sina.com.cn/result/100992.html [https:
//perma.cc/3BUG-89JF] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
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published by Legal Evening News on August 15, 2014. 254 The article
mentioned that the media coverage had been highly biased—it was
widely reported that Zhang accepted six million from Qualcomm,
even before it verified the currency in which the money was paid.255
The editorial also argued that the AMC is not a law enforcement
agency, nor a working commission, such as the SASAC. 256 It clarified
that the main function of the Expert Advisory Committee is to
provide advice to antitrust policy-making and enforcement, and it
lacked the power to influence decision-making directly. 257 The
editorial also noted that members of the Expert Advisory Committee
should have the freedom to conduct consulting work as long as they
were not advising the AMC. 258 Even if Zhang had accepted financial
benefits from advising an investigated firm, the main focus should be
whether the reasoning and the analysis performed by the expert made
sense. 259 However, such defense of Zhang was not well-received. In
WiseNews, I found no article that made an effort to understand the
substantive arguments proposed by Zhang. Rather, the focus was on
how much money that he had received from Qualcomm and whether
he should be dismissed for violating the disciplinary rules of the
Expert Advisory Committee.
The second editorial was published by the Securities Times on
August 18, 2014. 260 It first argued that lobbying is different from rent
seeking; the former is legal, while the latter is not. 261 It noted that one
characteristic of the NDRC’s enforcement is that it would give
generous leniency to those companies that readily admitted their guilt
and imposed higher sanctions on those that tried to defend
themselves. 262 This method deterred firms from challenging the
254. Miao Yinzhi & Ren Xiaolan, Lunzheng Fanlongduan Zhuanjia Dei Jiangli
[Discussing Antitrust Experts Should Make Sense], FAZHI WANBAO [LEGAL EVENING NEWS]
(August 15, 2014), http://money.163.com/14/0815/14/A3MOD9BO00253B0H.html [https://
perma.cc/XNX7-VLLG] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Xu Shengliang, Youshui Zhengfu , Zhege Keyi You [Lobbying the Government, This
Can Happen], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO [SECURITIES TIMES] (Aug. 18, 2014), http://
m.cgbchina.com.cn/exchangeNewDetail.gsp?newsId=6215521
[https://perma.cc/4UB6-HZ
VT] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
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NDRC in court and it had worked perfectly well thus far. 263 Thus, the
NDRC wanted to deter Qualcomm from suing the agency even before
it formally released its decision, and the Zhang Xinzhu incident was a
deliberate act of hitting the mountain to scare the tiger (meaning
“showing of strength as a warning”) to deter Qualcomm from
challenging its case in court. 264 The editorial argued that firms subject
to an antitrust investigation should have the freedom to engage
experts to lobby the government, as long as such lobbying is made
public. 265 The author lamented that some foreign firms become
corrupt after they start operating in China, many of which would not
resort to rent seeking if such lobbying were effective. 266
Despite the doubts expressed in these two editorials, no other
reports in the WiseNews sample defended Zhang Xinzhu. For
instance, China Business News interviewed several leading Chinese
antitrust experts in early October 2014. 267 The interviewees
unanimously believed that Zhang had violated the conflict of interest
rules while serving as a member of the Expert Advisory
Committee. 268 One antitrust expert was quoted as follows: “The
figure (of Qualcomm’s compensation for Zhang) is too big, it is
difficult for me to imagine such an amount. Is there something wrong
here? If he was not a member of the Expert Advisory Committee,
would he be able to receive such a high sum?” 269 Another expert
recalled that he accepted an advisory project with a multinational firm
in 2004 but only asked for RMB 50,000. 270 Many believed that Zhang
Xinzhu received such high compensation because of his affiliation
with the Expert Advisory Committee. 271 According to the news,
Qualcomm had tried to engage several experts who served on the
Expert Advisory Committee, but Zhang Xinzhu was the only one who
accepted the job.
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Deep Trouble], DIYI CAIJIN RIBAO [CHINA BUSINESS NEWS] (Oct. 13, 2014), http://
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VI. THE POPULIST DEMAND
Critical comments over the NDRC’s actions were rare, but their
existence also demonstrates that public criticism of administrative
enforcement is not a taboo subject or politically sensitive news
subject to censorship. After all, the Chinese media is the mouth and
ears for the Party, and abuse of administrative discretion of low-level
officials are frequently exposed under the spotlight in the Chinese
media. Then how do we explain the rarity of such critical comments?
As explained in the previous section, the strategic leakage of
information from regulators to media outlets, and the self-censorship
by Chinese antitrust experts, distorts the supply of media coverage
over Chinese antitrust. However, the problem is not just the
manipulation of supply, but a more fundamental one—the consumer
demand also creates disincentives for media to expose negative news
about antitrust interventions.
Abundant literature by economists and political scientists show
that readers find a news report more credible and memorable when its
story is consistent with their beliefs. 272 Economists have also found
that newspapers have incentives to slant their news in the same
direction, as media spinning will make their news reports more
credible and memorable to readers. 273 Indeed, the loosening of state
control over the Chinese media has enhanced its ability to respond to
consumer demand. Commercialized media in China, therefore, has
the incentive to appeal to or even create popular opinion. 274 Topics
that stimulate popular sentiments will tend to attract an audience. As
illustrated in the examples below, the Chinese public loathes high
prices and applauds the antitrust regulator’s vow to reduce prices for
consumers. As such, the media is more concerned about the effects of
the antitrust investigation on consumer prices, rather than its
legitimacy. Nationalist sentiments can also be easily stirred up when a
famous domestic brand is being acquired by a large multinational
firm. The media’s focus is not on whether the foreign acquisition
272. See generally Russell J. Dalton et. al., Partisan Cues and the Media: Information
Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1998); Robert Erikson,
The Influence of Newspaper Endorsements in the Presidential Elections: The Case of 1964, 20
AM. J. POL. SCI. 207 (1964); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans
and Democrats Divide on Religious Values, 120 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1283 (2005).
273. See Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, Media Bias, HARVARD INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH DISCUSSION PAPER (2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9295.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2K2-GUEU] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
274. Liebman, supra note 21, at 8.
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violates the AML, but rather whether the transaction should be
blocked because of its threat to domestic industries.
A. Price Regulator in RPM Cases
To gauge how the media “adjudicates” a RPM case before the
NDRC makes its decision, I focus my study on the three RPM cases
in which there were prior public disclosures of the investigations
before the agency released its decisions. Using the WiseNews
database, I searched for relevant news articles275 on each of the cases
during the period between the first public disclosure of the
investigation 276 and the day before the NDRC’s decision. 277
Two major themes emerge from a review of the coverage in the
Infant Formula Case and the Auto Part Case. One is the condemnation
of excessive pricing. Many reports discussed the abnormal profits
reaped by the firms involved, the unusually high prices of these
consumer products, or the comparison of the prices of products in
China and elsewhere. The other theme centers around the price
reduction voluntarily offered by the companies under investigation.
Just two days after the NDRC’s announcement, Wyeth announced a
price reduction for its milk powder and others quickly followed. 278
Similarly, some manufacturers proactively offered to reduce the
prices of their auto parts in response to the NDRC’s probe into the
auto industry. 279 Most news articles focused on various topics
275. For the Infant Formula Case, I conducted my search using the key words “milk
powder and NDRC”; for the White Liquor Case, I conducted my search using the key words
“Maotai or Wuliangye and NDRC”; for the Auto Part Case, I conducted my search using the
key words “Auto and NDRC.” For all these searches, I used the WiseNews database and
limited my search on news articles published by media outlets in mainland China.
276 . In each of these three cases, it were the companies that first disclosed the
investigation.
277. In both the White Liquor Case and the Infant Formula Case, the decisions were
made on all companies under investigation at the same time. However, because the Auto Part
Case was investigated by different local authorities of the NDRC, the decisions were imposed
by different authorities on different dates. For the purpose of this study, I used the date of the
first the NDRC decision released by Hubei Price Bureau on BMW dealers as the decision date.
278. Southern Daily, Huishi Naifen Zuigao Jiangjia Ercheng Yangnaifen Fanlongduan
Diaocha Xiaoying Chuxian [The Price of Wyeth Has Been Reduced By 20% at Most; The
Antitrust Investigation on Foreign Milk Powder Companies Has Begun to Work], XINLANG
CAIJING [SINA FIN.] (July 4, 2013), http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2013/07-04/
5001321.shtml [https://perma.cc/Y938-3K2N] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
279. Tom Mitchell, China Antitrust Ruling Blunts Foreign Criticisms, FINANCIAL TIMES
(August 21, 2014), at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/61d3f8aa-28ff-11e4-9d5d-00144feab
dc0.html#slide0 [https://perma.cc/H6PX-N6UZ] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
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revolving around price reductions, such as the magnitude of the price
reductions, whether they actually took place, whether such price
reductions were only short-lived, whether they would benefit
consumers in the long term, and whether such price reductions would
benefit or harm domestic manufacturers. Noticeably, very few media
reports tried to understand the legal basis for the NDRC’s
intervention, i.e., the legal merits of the case. Fewer mentioned that
there were actually grounds for an exemption for resale price
maintenance practices under the AML. 280 Rarely did news articles
cast doubt as to the legitimacy of the NDRC’s legal intervention. In
comparison, the White Liquor Case attracted much less publicity, and
there were far fewer reports that condemned Maotai’s or Wuliangye’s
pricing. As neither company offered to reduce prices in this case,
there was also no mention of price reductions in this case.
I analyze the content of each article by coding it as covering
each of the following five issues: excessive pricing of the products or
abnormal profits by the manufacturers (“Excessive Pricing”), price
reduction offered by the manufacturers (“Price Reduction”), legal
basis for the NDRC’s intervention (“Legal Merits”), grounds of
exemption for manufacturers under the AML (“Exemption”), and
doubts about the NDRC’s legal basis (“Doubts”). An article will be
coded as “1” if it has devoted at least one sentence 281 to discussing the
underlying topic. Otherwise, it is coded as “0”. A particular article
could receive multiple codes if, for example, it focused on multiple
topics. Figure 1 presents the percentages of the reports that covered a
particular topic among all the news reports on each case.

280. Art. 15, AML.
281. Sometimes an article only mentions a few words that are relevant to the topic but
they are only tangential to the discussion. In these circumstances, the article will be coded as 0.
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FIGURE 1: TOPICS OF DISCUSSION IN THE NEWS
COVERAGE OF THE THREE MAJOR RPM CASES
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Indeed, rather than injecting more transparency into the
investigation, many commercialized media sources in these cases
acted as cheerleaders for the regulator, aided and abetted the antitrust
regulator to monitor prices, and coerced firms to reduce prices, all
without clear evidence that the firm had committed an antitrust
violation in the first place. A few examples will illustrate this. On July
11, 2013, Beijing Morning Post reported the price reductions offered
by the infant formula producers. 282 The journalist inspected the prices
of the infant formula products made by the several firms subject to the
NDRC’s investigation and was disappointed to find no reduction in
retail prices on the shelves. 283 Several supermarkets explained that it
would take a couple of days for them to adjust the prices. 284 On July
13, 2013, another journalist inspected several supermarkets to monitor
the price reductions of the infant formula products. 285 She found that
282. Xiao Dan, Yan Naifen Jiangjia Beizhi Bu Jieke, Touhuan Gainian Bian Cuxiao
[Foreign Infant Formula Price Reduction Was Not Sufficient, Trying to Do Promotion
Instead], BEIJING CHENBAO [BEIJING MORNING POST] (July 11, 2013), http://
www.chinanews.com/sh/2013/07-11/5029985.shtml [https://perma.cc/GA62-2HHB] (archived
on Jan. 4, 2018).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Wang Fenglin, Yan Naifen Jiangjia Chengyi Bugou, Linshou Duan Da Guimo
Jiangjia Chichi Wei Xian [Foreign Milk Powders Did Not Show Sincerity in Reducing Prices,
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the prices for several brands had decreased—noting, for instance,
Wyeth had offered 11%-20% reduction for certain infant formula
products. 286 However, consumers were still not satisfied, noting that
the prices for the stage 1 and stage 2 infant formula products had
remained the same. 287 In another news report published by National
Business Daily, a reporter found that Wyeth even attempted to
increase the prices by introducing new infant formula products that
were closely similar to the previous product. 288
Such a hostile media environment exerted pressure on firms to
reduce prices to appease the disgruntled consumers. However,
voluntary price reduction also generated great fanfare in the media
and sent a signal to the public that these firms had indeed committed
an antitrust violation by overcharging consumers. The public’s
attention to the scale and scope of the price reduction overshadowed
the fundamental question about the legitimacy of the regulator’s
intervention in the first place.
B. Nationalism and Merger Control
In China, foreign acquisition of domestic assets can easily
become an emotionally charged hot button issue. As Susan Shirk once
commented: “Nationalist themes struck a chord in a country seeking
to revive itself as a major power after over a century of humiliating
weakness vis-à-vis foreign powers.” 289 The Chinese government is
ambivalent toward the nationalist slant in the Chinese media. 290 On
the one hand, nationalism appeared to be an effective way to foster
popular identification with the Chinese government. 291 On the other
hand, the government is concerned that the Chinese public might
topple its power if they perceive the government as weak for not

Massive Discounts of Retail Prices Haven’t Appeared], JINRI ZAOBAO [TODAY MORNING
POST] (July 13, 2013), http://finance.huanqiu.com/industry/2013-07/4127805.html [https://
perma.cc/ZNS3-CL5S] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Guo Mengyi & Wang Xia, Huishi Beizhi Xin Peifang Zhanghui Yuanjia Huoying
Zhong Pingpai Gengfeng, MEIJING [NBD.COM] (July 31, 2013), http://www.nbd.com.cn/
articles/2013-07-31/762556.html [https://perma.cc/9RV9-AZTE] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
289 . See Susan L. Shirk, Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China, 8
JAPANESE J. POL. SC. 43, 45 (2007).
290. Id., at 242.
291. Id.
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standing up to the foreign powers. 292 As illustrated in the CocaCola/Huiyuan case below, widespread nationalist sentiments could
exert pressure on the antitrust regulator to take a tough stand in
reviewing an acquisition from a foreign buyer.
On September 3, 2008, Huiyuan, a famous Chinese juice
manufacturer, announced that it was selling its shares to Coca-Cola
for twenty billion HKD (approximately 2.5 billion USD). 293 This was
the largest acquisition of a Chinese firm and the news caused a
sensation overnight. According to an online survey by Sina Net, as of
September 4, 2008, over 100,000 online participants took the survey,
of whom eighty-two percent opposed the transaction, and of whom
eighty-three percent believed that the transaction would destroy a
leading domestic company. 294 This results of the online survey were
widely quoted by the Chinese media. In the WiseNews database, I
identified 655 pieces of relevant news articles from the date of CocaCola’s announcement to the day before MOFCOM’s prohibition
decision, among which 150 quoted the survey results.
A number of news articles expressed doubts about the
acquisition. For instance, on September 9, 2008, Economy
Information Daily, a business-oriented newspaper owned by Xinhua
Newspaper, published an editorial warning regulators of the foreign
acquisitions of domestic brands. 295 It noted that over seventy percent
of the traditional Chinese brands have disappeared after the flooding
of foreign brands and those brands produced by joint ventures. 296 It
also highlighted several examples where Chinese brands disappeared
after acquisitions by foreign firms. 297 It called on the regulator to
strengthen its regulation and to tighten control over the foreign
292. Id.
293. Alison Leung & Fion Li, Coca-Cola To Buy Huiyuan in Largest China Takeover,
REUTERS (Sep. 3, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-coca-cola-huiyuan-idUSHKG15
315720080903 [https://perma.cc/SGR9-PKL8] (archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
294 . Wenhua Li & Junchu Zhu, Kekou Kele Yu Tun Huiyuan Guozhi Zhongguo
Wanming Bachen Bu Zantong [Coca-Cola Wanted to Swallow Huiyuan Juice, 80% Netizens
Disagreed], RENMING WAN [PEOPLE’S NET] (Sep. 8, 2008),
http://finance.ifeng.com/news/industry/200809/0908_2202_770288.shtml
[https://perma.cc/F387-593Q] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
295 . Zhang Kuixing, Jingfang Waizi Bingou Xingcheng Longduan Weiji Wo Jingji
Anquan [Beware Foreign Acquisition Became Monopolies Harm Our Economic Security],
JINGJI CANKAO BAO [ECONOMIC INFORMATION DAILY] (Sep. 9, 2008), http://finance.ce.cn/
macro/gdxw/200809/09/t20080909_13602625.shtml
[https://perma.cc/HE96-XKCV]
(archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
296. Id.
297. Id.
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acquisitions of domestic brands. 298 On September 8, 2008, the
People’s Net, a website owned by People’s Daily, published a long
article summarizing the public’s reactions to the merger. 299 It noted
that the results of the Sina survey suggested that an overwhelming
percentage of Chinese citizens strongly opposed the transaction. 300 It
then highlighted examples of the foreign acquisitions of famous
domestic brands. 301 It should be noted, however, that those news
articles that vehemently opposed the transaction only account for a
small minority. Many others are neutral, or even supportive of the
transaction. For example, Zhu Xingli, the chairman of the Huiyuan
Juice Company, tried to placate nationalistic sentiments, stating that
the sale is a purely commercial act, rather than anything symbolic.302
He said that companies should be raised like sons but sold like pigs,
and this statement was widely quoted by Chinese newspapers. 303
On September 9, 2008, Beijing Youth Daily published an
editorial entitled “Probably Difficult for Coke to Swallow Huiyuan,”
highlighting the two challenges for Coca-Cola. 304 The first challenge
was the national sentiments that were expressed through online
surveys and the news coverage. 305 The second challenge was the
recent scandal involving Sun Jingyi, a MOFCOM official in charge of
approving foreign acquisitions of domestic assets. 306 On September
25, 2008, Southern Weekend published a lengthy and detailed report
of the corruption case involving Sun, who abused his administrative
power when conducting merger reviews. 307 According to the report,
298. Id.
299. Li & Zhu, supra note 294.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Quan Jing, Huiyuan Zhu Xinli: Qiye Yinggai Dan Er Yan Dan Zhu Mai
[Enterprises Should Be Raised Like Sons and Sold Like Pigs], XINLANG CAIJING [SINA
FINANCE] (Sep. 6, 2008), http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20080906/22195279943.shtml
[https://perma.cc/G4YP-NR8X] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
303. Id.
304. Lu Ning, Kekou Kele Kong Nantun Huiyuan Guozhi [Probably Difficult for CocaCola to Swallow Huiyuan Juice], BEIJING QINGNIAN BAO [BEIJING YOUTH DAILY] (Sep. 9,
2008), http://stock.sohu.com/20080909/n259458535.shtml [https://perma.cc/3MK6-J8GZ]
(archived on Jan. 4, 2018).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Su Yongtong et al., Yige Shangwubu Guanyuan He Lvshimen De Yingmi Jiaoyi [A
Secret Deal between A MOFCOM Official and Lawyers], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN
WEEKEND] (Sep. 25, 2008), http://www.infzm.com/content/17636/1 [https://perma.cc/D9FCNZRJ] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
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Sun colluded with his friends who worked at law firms and accepted
bribes in exchange for the approvals of foreign acquisitions of
domestic assets. 308 MOFCOM officials denied that they were
influenced by any factors other than competition. However, it was
widely speculated among experts in China that the excessive media
coverage over this transaction contributed to MOFCOM’s
prohibition. 309 As admitted by Lin Zheying, a spokesperson from the
Foreign Investment Bureau of MOFCOM, in January 2009, the
potential interference of the widespread media coverage of this case
was one of the challenges posed to MOFCOM in dealing with its
merger review. 310
During this period, no news report discussed the legal merits of
the case. The focus of the debate in the media is about whether
nationalism should prevail in a merger transaction, not whether the
transaction should be blocked under Chinese antitrust law. The biased
media coverage also partly reflects the limited public awareness of the
rule of law in China. As the general public lacks a sophisticated
knowledge in antitrust law, they may judge MOFCOM’s performance
based on their understanding of fairness and justice. As such,
MOFCOM may be condemned as passive and incompetent had it
approved the transaction. Following the scandal of Sun Jingyi, the
public may even call for a probe into the MOFCOM officials for their
failure to block the deal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Understanding the role of media is crucial to understanding the
forces that have shaped the outcome in Chinese antitrust law.
Through the extensive analysis of the media coverage of six high
profile cases brought by the NDRC during 2008 to 2015, this Article
308. Id.
309. Jing Cuodao, Qing Hefang Yanjiu Yuan Yu Ma Guanyuan Lvshi Jiedu Shang Wubu
Foujue Huiyuan Shougou An [Researcher Qing Hefang and Lawyer Ma Guanyuan Interpret
MOFCOM’s Prohibition of Huiyuan Acquisition], FENGHUANG WANG CAIJING [PHOENIX
NET FINANCE] (March 19, 2009), http://finance.ifeng.com/hk/gs/20090319/460127.shtml
[https://perma.cc/7ZZK-PRCN] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
310. Liu Yinghua, Shui Juji Le Kekou Kele Shougou Huiyuan [Who Kills Coca-Cola’s
Acquisition of Huiyuan], BEIJING CHENBAO [BEIJING MORNING POST] (March 20, 2009),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20090320/08356002388.shtml [https://perma.cc/C6QU4S5N] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) (The other two factors that she considered include
MOFCOM needs to conduct a review of the consequences of the acquisition on the industry,
MOFCOM needs to conduct a review of the health of the overall industry).
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illustrates the complex relationship that exists between the Chinese
antitrust regulators, the media, and the Party during antitrust
enforcement. Chinese antitrust regulators are policy entrepreneurs
who are adept at using the media to mobilize public sentiments to
push forward difficult cases. They strategically leak information to
the state media in an attempt to manipulate the supply of information
to the public and then leverage the public endorsement to win
political support. Meanwhile, Chinese antitrust lawyers and
academics have a vested interest in promoting antitrust enforcement
and those who voice dissent face retaliation from the government.
This dampens public criticism over agency decisions. However, the
problem of the media’s bias is not just driven by these supply factors,
but also demand side bias. In response to the populist demand to
reduce consumer prices and nationalistic concerns, the media lacks
the incentive to publicize criticism of regulatory interventions. As
such, consumer demand converges with the regulatory demand for
intervention in these industries. This suggests that even if the judicial
oversight over administrative discretion is strengthened in China, and
the Chinese antitrust experts are incentivized to voice dissents, the
disincentives of the media to diffuse negative news about the
regulatory intervention will probably persist.
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Annex I
Decision
Year

Case Name

2009

Coca-Cola/

In March 2009, MOFCOM announced that it

Huiyuan

had

Description

blocked

Coca-Cola’s

proposed

acquisition of Huiyuan, a Chinese juice
manufacturer primarily on the ground that
Coca-Cola could have the ability to leverage
its dominant position in the carbonated soft
drink market to the juice market. 311
2011

China

In November 2011, NDRC announced its

Telecom/

investigation into China Telecom and China

China

Unicom, alleging that they had conducted

Unicom

price discrimination by charging their rival
ISPs much higher prices than those small
ISPs not competing with them. A few weeks
later, both SOEs proposed a number of
rectifications and requested suspension of the
investigation. The NDRC acknowledged the
receipt of the proposal and no fine was
imposed. 312

2013

White

The

Guizhou

Price

Bureau

held

that

Liquor Case Kweichow Moutai had conducted RPM in
violation of Art. 14 of the AML. Kweichow
311. MOFCOM, Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Shangwubu Gongbao [The Public
Announcement of MOFCOM of the People’s Republic of China], No 22, 2009,
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.shtml [https://perma.cc/6QFJMZDN] (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
312. No official decision was released in this case. For details of this case please see
Xiaoye Wang, The China Telecom and China Unicom Case and the Future of Chinese
Antitrust, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 467, 469 (Adrian Emch
& David Stallibrass eds., 2013).
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Moutai was fined RMB 247 million, or 1
percent of the “related” sales revenue in the
previous year. The Sichuan Development
and Reform Commission similarly fined
Wuliangye RMB 202 million, or one percent
of the “related” sales revenue in the previous
year. 313
2013

Infant

The nine milk powder companies were

Formula

accused

Case

distributors and retailers in violation of

of

fixing

resale

prices

for

Article 14 of the AML. NDRC fined six of
these producers a total of RMB 668.7
million, ranging from three percent to six
percent of prior year’s revenue. 314
2014- Auto Part

The Hubei Price Bureau announced that

2015

FAW-Volkswagen had conducted RPM with

Cases

its dealerships. The Bureau fined FAWVolkswagen RMB 248.58 million. It also
fined eight Audi dealerships RMB twenty
nine million.
313. Wuliangye Gongsi Shishi Jiage Longduan Bei Chufa 2.02 Yiyuan [Wuliangye
Conducted Price Monopoly and Was Fined RMB202 Million], SICHUAN DEV. AND REFORM
COMM’N
(Feb.
22,
2013),
http://www.scdrc.gov.cn/dir25/159074.htm
[https://perma.cc/QM3V-3P2C] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) (China); Guizhousheng Wujia Ju
[Guizhou Provincial Price Bureau], Guizhou Wujia Ju Guanyu Maotai Fanlongduan de Chufa
Gonggao [Guizhou Price Bureau’s Announcement Regarding the Maotai Case Antitrust
Punishment], WANGYI CAIJING [NETEASE FIN.] (Feb. 22, 2013), http://money.163.com/
13/0222/16/8OB59OO800252G50.html [https://perma.cc/MR2R-LVBB] (last visited Jan. 4,
2018).
314. Heshengyuan Deng Rufen Shengchan Qiye Weifan Fanlongduan Fa Xianzhi
Jingzheng Xingwei Gongbei Chufa 6.6873 Yiyuan [Biostime and Other Milk Powder
Companies Were Fined RMB 668.73 Million for Anti-Competitive Conduct and the Violation
of the AML], NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
xwzx/xwfb/201308/t20130807_552991.html (China).
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The Shanghai Price Bureau announced that
Chrysler had conducted RPM with its dealers
and fined Chrysler RMB 31.68 million.
The Jiangsu Price Bureau announced that
Mercedes-Benz had conducted RPM with its
dealers and fined the company RMB 350
million.
The Hubei Price Bureau announced that four
BMW dealerships had been involved in RPM
practices. The bureau fined the dealerships a
collective total of RMB 1.63 million.
Guangdong DRC announced that DongfengNissan had conducted RPM practices and
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fined Dongfeng-Nissan RMB 123 million. It
also fined seventeen dealerships a total of
RMB nineteen million. 315
2015

Qualcomm

The NDRC found that Qualcomm abused its
dominant market position in the licensing of
standard

essential

patents

concerning

wireless telecommunication and baseband
chip technologies. It imposed a number of
behavioral remedies on Qualcomm and a fine
of RMB 6,088 million, or eight percent of its
sales revenue in 2013. 316

315. From 2014 to 2015, various local authorities of NDRC investigated a number of
premium auto manufacturers and their dealers for alleged RPM practices. See Yiqi Dazhong
Jiage Longduan Beifa 2.4 Yi [FAW-Volkswagan Was Fined RMB 240 Million for Antitrust
Violation], Yangcheng Wanbao (Sep. 12, 2014), http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews
/20140912/140920277963.shtml [https://perma.cc/FDS5-VH52] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018);
Shanghaishi Wujia ju Shanghai Price Bureau], Shanghai Shi Wujiaju Xingzheng Chufa Jueding
Shu (Kelaisile Zhongguo Qiche Xiaoshou Youxian Gongsi) [Decision Regarding The Penalty
of Chrysler], SHANGHAI MUN. DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www.shdrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jggl/jghzcfjds/24064.htm
[https://perma.cc/5N8Q-DHQY]
(last visited Jan. 4, 2018); Li Jianping, Hubei Sijia Baoma Qiche Xiaoshou Shang Shexian
Jiage Longduan Beifa 162wan [Four Dealers of BMW In Hubei Were Fined RMB1.62 Million
For
Price
Monopolies],
PHOENIX
NEW
MEDIA
(Aug.
13,
2014),
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140813/41565291_0.shtml; Jiangsu Sheng Wujia ju [Jiangsu Price
Bureau], Jiangsusheng Wujiaju Dui Benchi Gongsi Jiage Longduan An Zuochu Xingzheng
Chufa [Jiangsu Price Bureau Made Decisions Regarding The Penalty of Mercedes-Benz For
Price Monopolies], CHINA JIANGSU NETWORK (April 23, 2015), http://
jsnews2.jschina.com.cn/system/2015/05/21/024806045.shtml [https://perma.cc/92XB-B2ZH]
(archived on Jan. 4, 2018); Guangdong Fagaiwei Dui Dongfeng Richan Kaichu 1.2 yiyuan
Longduan Fadan [Dongfeng-Nissan Was Fined 120 Million by Guangdong NDRC for AntiCompetitive Practices], NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N (Sept. 10, 2015), http://
fgs.ndrc.gov.cn/xtjl/201509/t20150925_752485.html [https://perma.cc/8RFW-5U5Y] (last
visited Jan. 17, 2018) (China).
316. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Fazhan He Gaiga Weiyuanhui Xingzheng
Chufa Juedingshu [NDRC’s Decision Regarding the Penalty of The Violation of the AML],
NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/
201503/t20150302_666209.html [https://perma.cc/4TWM-LUMD] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018)
(China).

